COMMENTS
Community Resistance to School Desegregation:
Enjoining the Undefinable Class
Federal district courts have often faced serious community resistance to the implementation of desegregation judgments, most
recently to those decrees that require busing as a means of achieving
unitary school systems. Almost twenty years ago the Supreme Court
declared that resistance from the community would not be allowed
to frustrate the implementation of the constitutional requirement
that school segregation be abolished.1 Since then, the federal courts
have consistently affirmed this commitment, employing a panoply
of substantive and procedural powers to enforce the mandate announced in Brown v. Board of Education.2 A recent judicial response
to community resistance has been to issue orders designed to prevent entire communities from engaging in specified activities.'
Some courts have even proscribed in general terms all conduct that
may unduly interfere with the implementation of a desegregation
decree.4
"The constitutional rights of respondents are not to be sacrificed or yielded to...
violence and disorder .

. . ."

Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958).

2 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
3 E.g., Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass.) (Boston schools found segregated and remedial plans ordered), aff'd sub nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975), desegregationplan ordered, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D.
Mass. 1975), orders issued, No. 72-911-G (D. Mass., Sept. 5, 1975; Dec. 17, 1975) (orders
requiring measures to protect decree from community resistance), desegregationplan af/d,
530 F.2d 431 (1st Cir. 1976); Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 925 (6th
Cir.) (reversing district court to find segregation in three school districts in county), vacated
and remanded, 418 U.S. 918 (1973), opinionreinstatedwith modifications, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975), mandamus issued, 521 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1975)
(consolidating actions and requiring approval of plan for desegregation of new county-wide
school district for coming school year), orders issued, Nos. 7045 & 7291 (W.D. Ky., July 30,
1975; Sept. 2, 1975; Sept 6, 1975) (orders requiring measures to protect decrees from
community resistance); see notes 22 & 26 infra; Mims v. Duval County School Bd., 338 F.
Supp. 1208 (M.D. Fla. 1971), supplemented, 350 F. Supp. 553 (1972), contempt citation
aff'd., United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1972); Lynch v. Snepp, 350 F. Supp. 1134
(W.D.N.C. 1972), rev'd on othergrounds, 472 F.2d 769 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
983 (1974).
E.g., Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92, 94 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834 (1957)
("in any way interfering with the carrying out of the court's order"); Mims v. Duval County
School Bd., 338 F. Supp. 1208 (M.D. Fla. 1971), supplemented, 350 F. Supp. 553, 554 (1972)
("any other act to disrupt the orderly operation of Oceanway School"); Stell v. Board of
Educ., No. 1316 (S.D. Ga. March 16, 1972) (:'interfering with the plan of desegregation");
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The purpose of this comment is to examine the legitimacy of
these "community injunctions" 5 as a means of ensuring the implementation of school desegregation decrees. The comment first discusses the enforcement problems peculiar to school desegregation
judgments, then describes and evaluates existing methods of enforcing desegregation judgments against community resistance in order
to determine the need for community injunctions as an additional
enforcement technique. In light of that discussion, recent enforcement orders are examined to determine their legal status and comparative effectiveness as methods of enforcement. The comment
concludes that, notwithstanding the courts' real need for potent
weapons to enforce their desegregation judgments, the enforcement
problems of school desegregation cannot justify the use of orders
that directly or indirectly prohibit interference from the community
at large.
I.

A.

ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

Community Resistance

In the decades since Brown, federal district courts have dealt
with two recurring problems in implementing school desegregation
decrees. First, courts have had to devise ways of meeting changing
forms of resistance by state and local governments to the requirement that dual school systems be abolished.' Second, courts have
faced widespread, sometimes violent, community resistance to
court-ordered desegregation.7 Unlike most injunctive decrees, which
Stanley v. Darlington County School Dist., 313 F. Supp. 439, 440 (D.S.C. 1970) ("individually
or collectively interfere with the operation of the public schools").
"Community injunctions" refer to court orders that seek to control the conduct of an
entire community, either directly by orders addressed to "all persons" or indirectly by orders
addressed to local officials.
I The history of attempts to evade or limit this requirement and judicial responses to
such attempts have been treated in detail elsewhere. See, e.g., Fiss, The Fate of an Idea
Whose Time Has Come: Anti-DiscriminationLaw in the Second Decade after Brown v. Board
of Education, 41 U. Cm. L. REV. 742, 752-58 (1974); Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of
School Integration Since Brown v. Board of Education, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 7 (1975);
Note, Schools, Busing, and Desegregation:The Post-Swann Era, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1078,
1083-90 (1971).
7 See, e.g., W. RECORD & J. RECORD, LrrME ROCK, U.S.A. (1960) (discussing the violent
response to school desegregation in Little Rock in 1957); Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92 (6th
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834 (1957), discussed in Murphy, The Contempt Power of
the Federal Courts, 18 FED. B.J. 34, 40-41 (1958). Recent examples of civil unrest in response
to desegregation have occurred in Boston and Louisville, Kentucky. See, e.g., Newburg Area
Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., Nos. 7045 & 7291 (W.D. Ky., Sept. 6, 1975); Morgan v.
Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 224-25 (D. Mass. 1975) (describing the violence surrounding the
implementation of busing plans).
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impose legal restraints and duties on a minority of the community,
school desegregation orders are effectively "imposed" on entire communities, requiring the affirmative involvement and the cooperation of many persons who were not parties to the litigation. This is
particularly true of plans that alter school attendance zones or that
require two-way busing. Furthermore, court-ordered desegregation
often evokes intense reactions from many different sectors of a
community. These characteristics make desegregation decrees particularly vulnerable to disruption and delay by an "undefinable
class" of individuals who8 are neither parties to the litigation nor
legally related to parties.
Community resistance can take several forms, some of which
are beyond the present scope of courts' remedial powers. The phenomenon of "white flight," perhaps the most serious long-term
obstacle to achieving desegregated school systems, cannot be controlled by a desegregation court.' A form of resistance that courts
may be able to remedy is a refusal to cooperate with a desegregation
order by, for example, refusing to send a child to his newly assigned
school while keeping him in the public school system.' 0 Another
form of resistance is nonviolent conduct that seeks to obstruct the
implementation of desegregation indirectly. This form of resistance
is the most troubling to courts in the short run, for although it
threatens the successful enforcement of the decree, it may not be
susceptible to the techniques available to confront the problems of
direct or violent obstruction of the decree. For example, speech in
public places that does not present an imminent danger of inciting
lawless conduct may still threaten the peaceful implementation of
desegregation by intimidating the participants in a busing program
or by arousing community resentments which may develop into
resistance to the desegregation plan." Conduct not involving speech
I United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261, 266 (5th Cir. 1972); Rendleman, Beyond Contempt:
Obligors to Injunctions, 53 TEXAS L. REv. 873, 918 (1975).
9 The impact of school desegregation cannot be minimized by compromising a decree so
that whites who might flee if there were complete desegregation will remain in the school
district. See United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972). Conversely, a desegregation plan cannot be expanded to an interdistrict remedy solely because
whites have already left the central city and will continue to do so. See Milliken v. Bradley,
418 U.S. 717 (1974). Population shifts subsequent to the implementation of a desegregation
decree do not justify annual readjustments of the decree. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v.
Spangler, 96 S. Ct. 2697 (1976).
z,Board of Educ. v. York, 429 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971).
12 See Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., Nos. 7045 & 7291 (W.D. Ky., July
30, 1975; Sept. 2, 1975) (orders prohibiting all "profane" protest and restraining the Safety
Director from issuing parade permits and creating a "Hyde Park speakers comer" in the
county fairgrounds parking lot on the outskirts of the city). On September 6, the court
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may also present such a latent threat to orderly enforcement.' 2
B.

Recent Judicial Response to Community Resistance

Faced with community resistance to the implementation of
their desegregation decrees, several district courts have responded
with detailed sets of orders designed to deal with the problem. In
3
1971 the district court in Mims v. Duval County School Board1
ordered the desegregation of Jacksonville's school system according
to a plan consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Swann v.
Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education.4 After the implementation of the desegregation order, which required the pairing and
clustering of previously segregated schools, racial unrest and violence developed at Ribault High School."5 Racial tensions forced
the closing of the school on one occasion. The Superintendent of
Schools and the Sheriff of Jacksonville petitioned for injunctive
relief, seeking to restrain outsiders from interfering with the operation of the school. The district court, acting ex parte, granted the
requested relief. The order applied to "all Ribault Senior High
School students and any person acting independently or in concert
with them and having notice of this order." 7 Violation of the order
by unauthorized entry onto the school grounds was the subject of a
contempt citation that was affirmed in United States v. Hall.'
abolished "all protest areas" around the schools and directed the jamming of citizens' band
radio channels because they had been "utilized by unlawfully acting protesters to prevent
the implementation of our desegregation order of July 30, 1975." See note 22 infra.
These enforcement orders may well infringe first amendment rights. See Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (advocacy that does not present an imminent and likely danger
of inciting lawless conduct is protected by the first amendment); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147, 163 (1939) (the exercise of speech in appropriate places cannot be abridged on the excuse
that it may be exercised in some other place). This comment will not examine the scope of
first amendment protections as a substantive limit on the authority of courts to regulate
resistance to school desegregation. The procedures for issuing orders regulating such
resistance have first amendment implications that are discussed at text and notes at notes
198-211 infra.
"2 For example, both the Louisville and Boston courts prohibited assemblies of small
groups of persons along bus routes "while school buses are being operated along them."
Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., Nos. 7045 & 7291 (W.D. Ky., Sept. 6, 1975);
Morgan v. Kerrigan, No. 72-911-G (D. Mass., Sept. 5, 1975).
" 329 F. Supp. 123 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd, 447 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1971).
, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). For the history of the litigation concerning the desegregation of the
Duval County schools, see United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261, 262 (5th Cir. 1972); Board of
Public Instruction v. Braxton, 402 F.2d 900, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1968).
11For a summary of the situation that followed the desegregation order, see Mims v.
Duval County School Bd., 338 F. Supp. 1208, 1209 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
19Id.
'7
"

Id. (emphasis added).
472 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1972).
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Louisville, Kentucky began county-wide busing for desegregation in the fall of 1975. The district court encountered serious, sometimes violent community resistance to the busing plan. 9 This resistance was not confined to racial tensions and violence in the schools,
but extended to the community at large, which more than once had
erupted into mob action. In Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Jefferson
County Board of Education,2 District Judge Gordon employed orders nearly identical in form to those used in Mims. The majority
of the enforcement orders issued in Newburg Area Council were
directed, as in Mims, to the community at large,2' and focused on
directly controlling resistance to the desegregation decree.2 2 How" For Judge Gordon's description of violent obstruction of his decrees, see Newburg Area
Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., Nos. 7045 & 7291 (W.D. Ky., Sept. 6, 1975) (ordering safety
and discipline measures).
" Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir.), vacated and
remanded, 418 U.S. 918 (1973), opinion reinstatedwith modifications,510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975), mandamus issued, 521 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1975).
22 E.g., Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., Nos. 7045 & 7291 (W.D. Ky., Sept.
6, 1975; Aug. 21, 1975) ("no person shall" and "any person destroying"). See also Stell v.
Board of Educ., No. 1316 (S.D. Ga., March 16, 1972) ("all individuals regardless of race,
creed, or age").
" In his initial order of July 30, 1975, attached to the desegregation decree, Judge Gordon
placed the following restraints on private conduct:
1. Those persons wishing to protest the court's judgment. . . may employ signs
or placards, or voice, so long as their actions are not violent, are not profane, and are
not threatening in nature, and provided further; that those persons occupy the protest
areas to be designated and defined at each school by the United States Marshal in
charge, or the police officers in attendance ...
5. No person shall by the use of any automobile, or otherwise, attempt to block or
impede the authorized flow of traffic in, to, or from any school building property; nor
shall any person, not authorized by his official position, attempt to enter upon or board
any school bus either to place thereon or remove therefrom any enrolled student; nor
shall any person threaten to or impede the right of any enrolled student to walk to, from,
or into, any school facility when said student is about the business of attending school
or walking in return to his home following school hours. Violations hereof will subject
one to federal custody and federal enforcement proceeding.
6. No person shall interfere with, nor cause threats to be made, or unlawful pressures to be exerted, against any employee of the school system or members of their
families, or school board member, or volunteer, intended or directed toward the prevention of the performance of their official duty by them, or intended in any manner to
prevent their carrying out and complying with the desegregation judgment and plan of
this Court.
Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., Nos. 7045 & 7291 (W.D. Ky., July 30, 1975).
The order of September 6, 1975 added additional restraints, providing that:
1. All protest areas are hereby abolished.
2. No persons shall assemble in or near any public school building not authorized
by the school authorities.
3. Persons, more than three in number, shall not gather or assemble along any bus
route in this . . . county while school buses are being operated along them.
Any person having notice of this order who violates any of the terms hereof shall be
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ever, the Newburg Area Council orders were novel in two respects.
First, the orders were issued by the court sua sponte rather than in
response to petitions from either local officials or parties to the
desegregation suit. Second, Judge Gordon attempted to exercise
indirect control over the community by ordering local officials to
23
prevent or regulate certain conduct.
In 1974 Boston's school system began busing in compliance
with the desegregation judgment in Morgan v. Kerrigan.24 The
district court met very serious and widespread community hostility
and resistance to the enforcement of the busing plan. In response
Judge Garrity joined local officials as defendants in the Morgan v.
Kerrigan litigation.2 5 These officials were bound to the court's 1975
"Orders Concerning Security." By ordering these city officials to
regulate the conduct of private persons, the court sought to exercise
2
indirect control over the entire community.
These two types of enforcement orders, direct and indirect, will
subject to arrest, prosecution and punishment, by imprisionment [sic] or fine or both
for criminal contempt of this court under the laws of the United States of America.
Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., Nos. 7045 & 7291 (W.D. Ky., Sept. 6, 1975).
Paragraph 3 of the order was voided on August 31, 1976.
1 Several orders were directed to officials for the purpose of regulating private citizens'
conduct. E.g., Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., Nos 7045 & 7291 (W.D. Ky.,
Sept. 2, 1975; Sept. 6, 1975) (first ordering the Safety Director of the city of Louisville to issue
parade permits only for gatherings in a large open area away from the city and then ordering
a member of the board of education to "jam" all citizens' band radio channels in the area to
prevent their use in organizing protests against the desegregation order).
2 Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass.), aff'd sub nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan,
509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975), desegregationplan ordered,
401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 431 (1st Cir. 1976).
2 Joined as "city defendants" were "the Boston School Committee, Superintendent and
Mayor and their agents, servants, employees and attorneys." Morgan v. Kerrigan, No. 72911-G (D. Mass., Sept. 5, 1975). The court's orders also required the cooperative efforts of
"the Boston Police, in collaboration with Massachusetts State Police, Metropolitan District
Commission Police and United States Marshals and Deputy Marshals."
21 The orders require the city defendants to "see to it" that the police prohibit the
following conduct:
(a) all gatherings of three or more people and all noisy or threatening conduct
including picketing within 100 yards of the premises of any public school building which
are likely to disrupt classwork or extracurricular programs or make students or teachers
reasonably fearful for their safety as they arrive or depart from school; and
(b) all gatherings of three or more people engaged in or threatening to engage in
violent conduct on or adjacent to any school bus or MBTA route or loading or unloading
area used for the purpose of transporting students or used by students walking to or from
public schools which make students or bus drivers reasonably fearful for their safety
while en route to or from school or damage the vehicle in which students are riding or
impede its progress.
Morgan v. Kerrigan, No. 72-911-G (D. Mass., Sept. 5, 1975). In its order of December 17, 1974,
the court also ordered the School Committee and Superintendent to promulgate and enforce
school discipline codes prohibiting students from communicating racial slurs or epithets.
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be examined as to their legitimacy and efficacy. This assessment
will be made in light of the various alternative methods courts can
use to enforce school desegregation judgments.
II.

A.

METHODS OF ENFORCING SCHOOL DESEGREGATION JUDGMENTS

Criminal Laws and Local Ordinances

1. State Criminal Laws and Local Ordinances. The most
immediately threatening manifestations of resistance to desegregation judgments typically violate state criminal laws dealing with
assault and battery, breach of the peace, trespass, or destruction of
property. Even actions of an undefinable class that present a latent
rather than a direct threat to the enforcement of the judgment can
often be regulated by enforcing local ordinances dealing with parade
permits, public nuisances, and the like.
Courts have perceived, however, that existing state and local
statutes are not always adequate to protect the implementation of
desegregation decrees. First, criminal proscriptions are limited to
relatively narrowly defined conduct, including a specific mental
state. It is possible to engage in conduct that is not proscribed by
state or local statutes, yet still presents a significant obstruction to
peaceful desegregation. 27 An example of such obstruction is the
gathering of small groups of persons along school bus routes. Courts
perceive that the mere presence of such groups when school buses
are operating under a busing decree presents a potential for violence
and intimidates those involved in busing; 2 yet no state law or municipal ordinance prohibits small groups of parents from walking
their children to bus stops.
Another disadvantage of reliance on state and local laws in
Finally, the "city defendants" were ordered to "insure the exclusion from every public school"
of all persons except students and enumerated classes of persons who need to enter schools
for reasons associated with the normal functioning of the schools. The careful qualifications
of these orders suggests that Judge Garrity patterned his orders after the time, place, and
manner concerns expressed in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). For a
discussion of Grayned, see Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. CT.
REV. 233, 250-56. The orders in Morgan v. Kerrigan may be compared with the similar,
somewhat less explicitly qualified orders issued in Mims v. Duval County Bd. of Educ., 338
F. Supp. 1208, 1209 (M.D. Fla. 1971), supplemented, 350 F. Supp. 553 (1972).
2 Other examples of obstruction that are outside the ambit of state and local laws are
refusing to send a child to the school assigned under a desegregation decree while keeping
the child in the public school system, see Board of Educ. v. York, 429 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971), and threatening black parents with economic reprisals if
they send their children to "white" schools under a court-ordered freedom of choice plan. See
United States v. Farrar, 414 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1969).
2 See note 12 supra.
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effectuating a desegregation decree is that the federal district court
must depend on state and local law enforcement institutions to
protect an unpopular judgment. Doubts as to the ability and willingness of state and local authorities to protect civil rights adequately were among Congress's motivations in creating and reenacting federal criminal statutes proscribing interference with the exer29
cise of civil rights.
2. Federal CriminalLaws. Sections 241 and 242 of the Federal
Criminal Code are companion civil rights statutes which date from
the Reconstruction."0 Section 241 safeguards a citizen's rights and
privileges under the Constitution and laws of the United States
against private conspiracies to interfere with the exercise of those
rights.' Section 242 proscribes action under color of law that de2
prives any person of his federal statutory or constitutional rights.1
These statutes provided inadequate protection from official and private resistance to the civil rights movement of the 1960s, nearly a
century after their enactment.3 3 In response, Congress in 1968 enacted section 245,'3 "by far the most extensive and detailed
" See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 807-20 (1965) (legislative history of Enforcement Act of 1870); S. REP. No. 721, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1967), reprinted in [1968] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1837, 1839.

Act of May 31, 1870, § 6, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970); Act of Apr. 9, 1886, § 2, 18 U.S.C. §
242 (1970).
2, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970) states in relevant part:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in
the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution
or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same. . . . They
shall be fined . . . $10,000 or imprisoned . . . ten years, or both; and if death results,
they shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970) states,
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully
subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, . . . shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both; and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of
years or for life."
11S. REP. No. 721, supra note 29, at 4-5; 113 CONG. REc. 22,678-80 (1967) (remarks of
Rep. Celler).
u 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1970) was enacted as Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. It now
provides, inter alia:
(b) Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, by force or threat of force
willfully injures, intimidates, or interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimidate or
interfere with(2) any person because of his race, color, religion or national origin and because
he is or has been(A) enrolling in or attending any public school or public college; . ..
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criminal sanction civil rights legislation ever. . . enacted by Congress." 35 Section 245 prohibits any person, whether or not acting
under color of law, from interfering "by force or threat of force" with
any of the federally protected rights enumerated in the statute,
including the right to attend public schools without racially motivated interference.3 6 These statutes are valuable to a desegregation
court facing mass resistance to the implementation of its decree.
However, several characteristics of these provisions limit their use37
fulness in combating resistance from an undefinable class.
First, judicial efforts to construe sections 241 and 242 so as to
avoid unconstitutional vagueness have narrowed the application of
these statutes. The Supreme Court has held that the willful commission of an act that deprives a person of his constitutional rights
does not in itself violate sections 241 or 242.8 The prosecution must
also prove that the defendant acted with a specific intent to "deprive a person of a right which has been made specific either by the
express terms of the Constitution or laws of the United States or by
decisions interpreting them. '3 Although the defendant need not
have "been thinking in constitutional terms," he must have had a
purpose to deprive his victim of a constitutional right. 4 The vagueness of this specific intent requirement has limited the effectiveness
of these sections in punishing violations of civil rights.4' Juries hos(4) any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or
any other person or any class of persons from(A) participating, without discrimination on account of race, color, religion
or national origin, in any of the benefits or activities described . . or
(B) affording another person or class of persons opportunity or protection to
so participate;...
shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and
if bodily injury results shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than
ten years, or both; and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of
years or for life.
Other activities protected by this statute include voting, participation in any program that
is funded by federal funds, and engaging in peaceful protest activities for the purpose of
seeking redress for deprivations of constitutional rights or benefits.
31 I1 NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws, WORKING PAPERS 778-79
(1970); see S. REP. No. 721, supra note 29, at 3-4; 113 CONG. REC. 22,679-80 (1967) (remarks
of Rep. Celler).

u,18 U.S.C. §§ 245(b)(2)(A), (b)(4)(A)&(B) (1970).
"' The other federal criminal statute which has direct relevance to interference with
rights under a school desegregation decree, 18 U.S.C. § 1509 (1970) (obstruction of justice),
is discussed in text and notes at notes 129-42 infra.
11 In Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), the Court incorporated a specific intent
requirement into § 242. This requirement was subsequently read into § 241 in United States
v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 796-807 (1966); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 753 (1966).
3,Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 104 (1945).
,oId. at 106.
' For discussion of the practical problems created by the specific intent requirement,
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tile to federal enforcement of civil rights are able to acquit defendants on the basis of the state's failure to prove the existence of such
an elusive element of the offense.12 This specific intent requirement
contributed to a reluctance to use these statutes during periods
43
when the need for federal criminal prosecutions was most pressing.
A second major limit on the use of sections 241 and 242 is that
the two statutes have been interpreted not to proscribe all intentional deprivations of constitutional rights. Section 242 punishes
only acts done "under color of law," the equivalent of the fourteenth
amendment's state action requirement." In contrast, section 241 is
not limited to conduct involving state action. Because the statute
can be applied to purely private conduct, courts have construed it
to exclude the deprivation of any rights protected by the due process
or equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.4 5 Until
recently, the Supreme Court refused to apply section 241 when any
state action was involved." Viewing Congress as powerless to prohibit private interference with fourteenth amendment rights,4 7 the
Court limited section 241's scope to constitutional and statutory
rights existing independently of the fourteenth amendment."
see Clark, A Federal ProsecutorLooks at the Civil Rights Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 175,
182-84 (1947); Shapiro, Limitations in ProsecutingCivil Rights Violations, 46 CORNELL L.Q.
532 (1961); Comment, Legislating Civil Rights: The Role of Sections 241 and 242 in the
Revised Criminal Code, 63 GEO. L.J. 203, 217-21 (1974).
,2 In Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), a Georgia sheriff beat a handcuffed
black prisoner to death and was convicted under § 242 for depriving a citizen of his life
without due process of law. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded; on retrial, Screws
was acquitted when the jury was given an instruction containing the specific intent requirement.
11 See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, LAW ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT ON EQUAL PROTECTION
IN THE SOUTH 108-09, 118 (1965); authorities cited in note 41 supra.
Another reason for the small number of prosecutions brought under §§ 241 and 242 may
have been reluctance on the part of the Department of Justice to intrude into areas of criminal
law enforcement normally left to the states. See S. REP. No. 721, supra note 29, at 4. See
also B. MARSHALL, FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS 4 (1964), reviewed in Wasserstrom, Book
Review, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 406 (1966). The Screws majority viewed decreased federal enforcement as an advantageous result of the specific intent requirement. Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91, 105 (1945). This view has since been substantially eroded. The characterization
of civil rights as "affirmative federal rights" has been invoked as a justification for more
effective federal criminal legislation protecting civil rights. S. REP. No. 721, supra note 29,
at 3-4. In addition, judicial interpretation of the scope of Congress's power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment has been significantly broadened. See text at note 52 infra.
" See United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 78 (1951).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920) (private conspiracy to force
persons to leave the state outside scope of § 241).
, See United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 81-82 (1951).
T See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542 (1875); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
" See, e.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (§ 241 protects the right to vote
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Recent Supreme Court decisions have qualified the basis for
restricting the scope of these statutes. In United States v. Price,49
the Supreme Court reversed its previous position and held that
sections 241 and 242 are not mutually exclusive: both provisions
protect fourteenth amendment rights when the defendant has acted
under color of law.5 ° In United States v. Guest,"'six members of the
Court agreed that section 5 of the fourteenth amendment empowered Congress to "enact laws punishing all conspiracies to interfere
with the exercise of Fourteenth Amendment rights, whether or not
state officers or others acting under the color of law are implicated
in the conspiracy. 5 2 However, Justice Stewart, writing for the
Court, construed section 241 to "incorporate no more than the
Equal Protection Clause itself, '53 thus avoiding the issue of whether
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment54 empowers Congress to legislate against private conduct. When the conspiracy is directed at
the exercise of rights guaranteed by the equal protection clause, as
in Guest,55 state action must be involved. Justice Stewart found the
requisite involvement by interpreting the indictment to allege the
cooperation of state officials in the private conspiracy. 6 Even
though a majority of the justices stated that Congress could proscribe purely private violations of fourteenth amendment rights, the
Court did not hold that section 241 was such a statute. 57 Thus, the
in a federal election); In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895) (the statute protects the right to
inform federal authorities of violations of federal revenue laws); Wilkins v. United States, 376
F.2d 552 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 964 (1967) (§ 241 punishes private person who
murdered participant in protest march concerning the right to vote in federal elections). See
also United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920).
" 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
Id. at 798; see United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 753 (1966).
5' 383 U.S. 745 (1966). See generally Cox, Foreword: ConstitutionalAdjudications and
the Promotion of Human Rights, in The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HAxv. L. REv. 91
(1966).
51Id. at 782 (Brennan & Douglas, JJ., Warren, C.J., concurring and dissenting); id. at
761-62 (Clark, Black, & Fortas, JJ., concurring) (dictum). See generally Note, FederalPower
to Regulate Private Discrimination:The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 510-17 (1974).
11 383 U.S. at 754.
51 Section 5 provides, "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
" In Guest, a group of whites who had murdered a black man traveling through Georgia
were charged with conspiracy, inter alia, to interfere with the victim's right to equal use of
state-owned or -operated facilities. 383 U.S. at 747-48.
, 383 U.S. at 756-57. State officials had actively "connived" in the conspiracy by securing false arrests of blacks.
5' Three of the six concurring justices stated that § 241 encompassed wholly private
conspiracies to violate fourteenth amendment rights. Id. at 774-81 (Brennan & Douglas, JJ.,
Warren, C.J., concurring and dissenting). The other members of the Guest Court did not
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impact of Guest on section 241 is unclear," and neither Congress nor
the Supreme Court has subsequently construed the statute to encompass private interference with fourteenth amendment rights.-9
Section 241 would apply to private conspiracies to disrupt
school desegregation decrees if the right to attend nonsegregated
schools could be derived from a constitutional provision other than
the fourteenth amendment, or from a federal statute. Under the
thirteenth amendment, Congress has the power to punish racially
motivated interference with the exercise of constitutional rights 0
However, since Brown, the right to attend schools without regard to
race has been considered to flow from the fourteenth amendment."
An alternative approach is to argue that when desegregation is required by a federal court order, the right to attend nonsegregated
schools emanates from that order, which is a "law of the United
States" within section 241. A similar argument was considered in
express agreement with this view. The majority opinion said, "The statute does not purport
to give substantive, as opposed to remedial, implementation to any rights secured by [the
equal protection clause]." Id. at 754-55; see id. at 761 (Clark, Black, & Fortas, JJ., concurring); id. at 762 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
11 The Court left standing the holding of United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 73
(1951), that § 241 protects only those rights "arising from the substantive powers of the
Federal Government," excluding rights that the Constitution "merely guarantees against
abridgement by the States." Id. at 82.
1' Doubt as to congressional power to proscribe private conduct which interferes with
fourteenth amendment rights has divided the circuit courts as to the scope of 18 U.S.C. §
1985(3) (1970), the civil analogue of § 241. Compare Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d
206, 215 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc), and Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971)
(holding that § 1985(3) will reach private conduct violating fourteenth amendment rights),
with Murphy v. Mount Carmel High School, No. 75-1443 (7th Cir. Oct. 4, 1976), and Bellamy
v. Mason's Stores, 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding that § 1985(3) does not proscribe
private interference with fourteenth amendment rights). In Bellamy, the Fourth Circuit read
§ 1985(3) as the Supreme Court's opinion in Guest read § 241: the statute does not confer
any rights in addition to the rights which § 1 of the fourteenth amendment confers of its own
force. 508 F.2d at 507.
Even if § 1985(3) is properly considered to reach private actions which violate fourteenth
amendment rights, it is greatly limited as an effective tool for the enforcement of school
desegregation. By its terms, the remedy is limited to actual damages "occasioned by such
injury or deprivation." While the court in Action v. Gannon did give injunctive relief, such
relief is no longer available under the decision of Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693
(1973) (rejecting claim that § 1988 creates an independent federal cause of action for violation
of federal civil rights). The Moor Court indicated that an explicit remedial limitation in a
Reconstruction statute must be respected. Id. at 702-04, 711.
,1 See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 438-39 (1968).
11In Hayes v. United States, 464 F.2d 1252, 1260 (5th Cir. 1972), the court refused to
hold that the thirteenth amendment, in addition to the fourteenth amendment, secured the
right of black children to attend public schools without regard to race. The Fifth Circuit did,
however, find a statutory source of this right, and affirmed a conviction under § 241 for a
private conspiracy to blow up school buses. See text and notes at notes 64-69 infra.
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Wilkins v. United States. 2 Although the court found it unnecessary
to rule on the merits of this claim, it was properly skeptical as to
whether a judicial order could establish a right protected under
section 241 that the Constitution or a federal statute had not conferred.63
One court has held that section 241 will punish a private conspiracy to interfere with court-ordered busing. In Hayes v. United
States," the Fifth Circuit found a statutory basis for the right of
black students to attend schools without regard to race. 6 The court
held that Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 196466 secured this right
for the purpose of section 241.67 However, the court's interpretation
of Title IV's application to section 241 will not withstand analysis.
The right to attend schools on a nonsegregated basis is implicit in
Title IV, but the statute focuses on specific administrative and financial remedies against school officials and has little or no relevance to private resistance to a desegregation decree. There is no
indication that Title IV creates any additional rights or duties in the
area of school desegregation," and it is particularly inappropriate to
interpret Title IV as affecting the duties of private individuals.6 9
.2 376 F.2d 552 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 964 (1967). In this case, private individuals had conspired to murder participants in a civil rights protest march that was being carried
out under a court order.
11Id. at 561. The conviction under § 241 was affirmed on the ground that the marchers
were protesting restrictions on voter registration in federal elections, a right secured by the
federal constitution.
,4464 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1972). The court relied on Guest in holding that private
conspiracies against fourteenth amendment rights are outside § 241. Id. at 1259-60.
11Id. at 1261.
"442 U.S.C. §§ 2000c to 2000c-9 (1970). The court rested its assertion on § 2000c-2, which
authorizes federal technical and personnel assistance to school boards in drawing up desegregation plans; §§ 2000c-3, -4, which concern federally financed training in the problems and
techniques of school desegregation; § 2000c-6, which gives the Attorney General power to
institute desegregation suits where complainants are unable to do so; and on a sentence in
the legislative history of the Act which affirmed a national policy of assuring the "orderly
achievement of desegregation." 464 F.2d at 1261, quoting H. REP. No. 914, 88 Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2398.
,7464 F.2d at 1261.
Indeed, the major concern that courts have expressed in regard to Title IV was that it
would limit the equity powers of federal courts. The Act defines desegregation to exclude "the
assignment of students to public schools in order to overcome racial imbalance." 42 U.S.C. §
2000c(b). The Supreme Court has held that Title IV neither expands nor limits the powers
of federal courts to enforce the equal protection clause. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1971). See also McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1971).
41 Compare Hayes v. United States, 464 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1972), with United States v.
Johnson, 390 U.S. 563 (1968). In Johnson the Supreme Court held that § 241 could reach a
private conspiracy to assault blacks for exercising their right to equal use of public accommodations. The statutory codification of this right was found in § 201 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970). The statutory source of the protected right is unambiguous.
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The problems of vagueness and narrowness of scope that limited the use of sections 241 and 242 motivated Congress to enact the
specific and expansive provisions of section 245.70 Unlike section
241, section 245 encompasses private conduct that interferes with
fourteenth amendment rights.71 But section 245 is limited to acts of
"force or threat of force." The legislative history of the statute indicates that it was intended to "strengthen the capability of the Federal Government to meet the problem of violent interference...
with the free exercise of civil rights. 7 2 Thus section 245 cannot
reach private, nonviolent conduct 3 that interferes with the constitutional rights of black school children as defined by a desegregation
"All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of. . . accommodations at any
place of public accommodation." This is in sharp contrast to the provisions relied on in
Hayes. See Case Comment, Hayes v. United States: Private Interference with School
Desegregation,8 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 642, 654-57 (1973).
70 S. REP. No. 721, supra note 29, at 5-6 (1967). For the text of the statute, see note 34
supra.Unlike § 241, § 245 is not limited to conspiracies. Section 245 does, however, require a
showing of specific intent: a defendant must act "because of" racial factors and "because"
the victim is engaging in one of the activities protected by the statute. However, Congress
was careful to indicate that circumstantial evidence could be the basis of proving intent, S.
REP. No. 721, supra note 29, at 9, and courts have not found the specific intent requirement
a great obstacle to conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 525 F.2d 710 (1st Cir. 1975).
In this case the defendant, while participating in an antibusing demonstration, assaulted a
black man who was not affiliated with the school system either as an employee or as a parent.
The court found that the beating nevertheless had a chilling effect on other blacks seeking
to exercise their rights to attend nonsegregated schools. The defendant need not have known
the federal character or extent of the right of black children to attend nonsegregated schools,
so long as he intended to interfere with that right.
"' The theory behind the statute is that under § 5 and under the commerce clause,
Congress can prohibit racial violence directed at "activities closely related" to the exercise
of federally protected activities. "[I1f racial violence directed against activities as closely
related to those protected by Federal antidiscrimination legislation is permitted to go unpunished, the exercise of protected activities will be deterred." S. REP. No. 721, supra note 29,
at 6-7. Congress considered the agreement of the six Justices in Guest to have ended the
doubts regarding legislation prohibiting private actions which violate fourteenth amendment
rights. Id. at 7.
72 114 CONG. REC. 318-19 (remarks of Sen. Hart); id. at 535 (1968) (remarks of Sen.
Javits); 113 CONG. REC. 22757, 22678 (remarks of Rep. Celler); id. at 22685 (remarks of Rep.
McClory) (1967); H. REP. No. 473, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1967). See also II NATIONAL
COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 769 (1970) (noting that
school desegregation is primarily approached through "noncriminal sanction techniques"
unless and until interference rises to the level of violence or fraud).
13 The Supreme Court has construed § 245 to prohibit only violent interferences with the
exercise of the specified rights. Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, at 224 (1976) (orderly
arrest pursuant to state law enforcement is not "force or threat of force"). A vigorous dissent
by Justice Marshall argued that the statute had "broad remedial purposes and effects." Id.
at 232. The dissent insisted on construing "force or threat of force" in light of these "broad
remedial purposes," concluding that the process of arrest and prosecution was the method
by which state officials could "most plausibly exert force or the threat of force." Id. at 238.
See also New York v. Horelick, 424 F.2d 697, 703 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 939 (1970).

1976]

Community Injunctions

decree. Section 241 is not restricted to acts of force, 74 but under
present law, private interference with fourteenth amendment rights,
including the right to attend nonsegregated schools, is not within
the ambit of section 241.11 Wholly private acts of nonviolent interference with the implementation of school desegregation decrees are
therefore not within the scope of these federal criminal statutes."
Procedural requirements further curtail the usefulness of both
state and federal criminal statutes. Constitutional objections to the
statutes can be raised, and a jury trial is necessary, before criminal
sanctions can be imposed. In contrast, the procedure in prosecutions
for criminal contempt when a court's order has been violated are
relatively summary. 7 Finally, a court cannot initiate a criminal
prosecution.7 8 All of these factors contribute to the courts'
perception of their powerlessness in the face of resistance to desegregation judgments. 79 Seeking a method of vindicating their own authority courts have sought remedies that are more responsive to
their institutional vulnerabilities and needs.
B.

Injunctive Orders

Injunctive orders offer several major advantages over criminal
sanctions as a means of enforcing school desegregation judgments.
First, injunctions may be tailored to the kinds of conduct that the
71See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211 (1974) (officials who stuffed ballot
box were convicted for conspiracy to interfere with right to vote in federal election).
75But see Rosecrans v. United States, 378 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1967), where violent interference with a school desegregation decree was held to violate § 241. Rosecrans had engaged in
several bombings, including the bombing of a private home. There was no showing of state
action. On these facts, the defendant could clearly have been indicted for violating § 245. But
the case is at best a doubtful application of § 241.
1, For example, private persons who threaten economic reprisals for participation in a
desegregation decree, or enter school grounds and cause minor disruptions, or make nonthreatening but nonetheless intimidating speeches, with the intent to disrupt the orderly
implementation of desegregation, have not violated §§ 241, 242, or 245.
11 In federal courts, a jury trial is available in criminal contempt cases where the sentence
allowed or imposed is more than six months. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380
(1966). In state courts, jury trial is required for contempt where the offense is "serious."
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). See generally Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey,
56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, at 230-34 (1971).
19 See Peek v. Mitchell, 419 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1970) (Attorney General cannot be compelled to prosecute violations of civil rights statutes); United States v. Cox. 342 F.2d 167 (5th
Cir.) (United States Attorney cannot be so compelled), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
11 "The State and local governments possess all police powers necessary to enforce violations of the criminal laws of this State and so insure the safety and welfare. . . .At the same
time, this Court is under the duty to enforce its orders and to preserve the integrity and
effectiveness thereof." Stell v. Board of Educ., No. 1316 (S.D. Ga., March 16, 1972) (TRO
prohibiting "all persons" from "in anywise interfering" with the desegregation decree).
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court perceives to present a threat to enforcement, even if such
conduct violates no positive law. Second, violations of an injunction
can be punished in summary contempt proceedings,"0 in which the
collateral bar rule8' prevents alleged contemnors from raising substantive objections to the validity of the injunction. Third, through
the contempt power, the court that issued the injunction is empowered to sanction violations of its authority.12 The most important
limits on the effectiveness of injunctive orders as a method of enforcing judgments are the procedural requirements for issuance rather
than the nature of the conduct that may be proscribed 3 or the
procedures for enforcing orders that have been violated.
The issuance and effect of injunctions and temporary restraining orders (TROs) in the federal courts are governed by rule 65 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 The dominant purpose of the
8oThe procedures for criminal contempt prosecutions are set out in rule 42(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
11The collateral bar rule provides that one charged with violating an injunction cannot

raise the erroneousness or unconstitutionality of the injunction as a defense to contempt. The
only available defenses are that the injunction was void for lack of jurisdiction over the person
or over the subject matter, the contemnor had no notice of the injunction, did not violate it,
or was unable to comply. See generally Dobbs, Contempt of Court:A Survey, 56 CORNELL L.
REV. 183, 261-67 (1971). There is no bar to the assertion of defenses that statutes or ordinances
are invalid in proceedings against persons accused of violating them. Nor does failure to obey
a police order bar defenses based on its invalidity. Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963).
The asserted difference between injunctions on the one hand, and statutes, ordinances, and
police orders on the other, is the need to preserve the respect and dignity of the court issuing
the injunction, and to prevent "litigation on the streets." CompareWalker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320 (1967) (injunction), with Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394
U.S. 147 (1969) (ordinance).
To apply the collateral bar rule against nonparty contemnors precludes any opportunity
for such contemnors to litigate the substantive validity of the injunction. See, e.g., Reich v.
United States, 239 F.2d 134, 137-38 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1004 (1957). The
application of the collateral bar rule has been extensively criticized. See, e.g., Cox, The Void
Order and the Duty to Obey, 16 U. Cm. L. REv. 86 (1948); Comment, Defiance of Unlawful
Authority, 83 HARv. L. REV. 626, 629-38 (1969).
" [T]he power of a court to make an order carries with it the equal power to punish
for a disobedience of that order, and the inquiry as to the question of disobedience has
been from time immemorial, the special function of the court. And this is no technical
rule. In order that a court may compel obedience to its orders it must have the right to
inquire whether there has been any disobedience thereof. To submit the question of
disobedience to another tribunal . . .would operate to deprive the proceeding of half
its efficiency.
In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 594-95 (1895). A federal court is empowered to punish "at its
discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as- . . .(3) Disobedience or
resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command." 18 U.S.C. § 401(3)
(1970). For the full text of the statute, see note 168 infra.
11When conduct protected by the first amendment is involved, the constitutional protection may be an equally important limit on judicial authority. See note 11 supra.
81For the relevant parts of rule 65, see notes 97 & 102 infra.

Community Injunctions

1976]

requirements imposed by rule 65 is to limit the exercise of discretion
by federal courts issuing injunctions or TROs.ss The legal ancestor
of rule 65, the Clayton Act,86 sought to limit what were considered
endemic abuses in the issuance of injunctions. 7
The Supreme Court has taken an expansive view of the kinds
of judicial orders that are subject to rule 65. In Local 1291, International Longshoremen's Association v. Philadelphia Marine Trade
Association,8 8 the Court found that even though a district court
order enforcing an arbitrator's award might not be an "injunction"
within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,88 it was still an
"equitable decree compelling obedience" and therefore an "order
granting an injunction" for the purpose of rule 65(d).1° Similarly,
court orders "enforcing" prior orders of the National Labor Relations Board are within the ambit of rule 65.1 The same reasoning
should bring orders enforcing outstanding judgments of federal district courts within rule 65. Orders enforcing judgments are injunctive in effect; their use and scope should therefore be governed by
the law of injunctions. 2
The notice and hearing requirements of rule 65 furnish an important restriction on the issuance of injunctive relief. A court can
"7 MOOR's FEDERAL PRACTICE 65.02[1], at 65.17 (2d ed. 1975) (rule 65 "reflects the
long established policy of strict control of the injunctive process-a policy generally reflected
in the careful exercise of the power to issue the injunction, preliminary or final, in any of its
several forms").
" Sections 17 and 19 of the Clayton Act, Act of Oct. 15, 1914, Ch. 323 §§ 17, 19, 38 Stat.
737, 738, were enacted as part of the Judiciary Code of 1940, 28 U.S.C. §§ 381, 383. These
sections were repealed in 1948, having been replaced by rules 65(b) and 65(d). 7 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 65.01[4], -01110], at 65-7 n.1 and 65-12 n.6 (2d ed. 1975).
I Section 19 of the Clayton Act, from which the rule was taken, was designed to cure
inter alia "the issuance of injunctions without parties." See 48 CONG. REc. 6436, 62d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1912) (remarks of Rep. Davis). In the House report, Rep. Clayton described the
purpose of the provisions: "The too ready issuance of injunctions or the issuance without
proper precautions or safeguards has been called to the attention of Congress session after
session ....

The bill ...

seeks to remedy the evils complained of ......

H.R. REP. No.

612, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1912). See also F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR
INJUNcTION 185 (1930) (stating that the relevant sections of the Clayton Act were intended to
correct the issuance of injunctions without notice, detail, or parties).
389 U.S. 64 (1967).

29 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).

',

N 389 U.S. at 75.
" Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 177 (1973); Regal Knitwear v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 13-15 (1945).
12 See Rendleman, Obligors to Injunctions, supra note 8, at 876, citing F. MArrLAND,
EQUrrY 9 (2d ed. 1936) ("An injunction is a court order requiring a person to do something or
forbidding a person from doing something"). See also 2 STORY'S EQurry JURISPRUDENCE § 861
(1st ed. 1836) ("A Writ of Injunction may be described to be a judicial process, whereby a
party is required to do a particular thing, or to refrain from doing a particular thing, according
to the exigency of the writ").
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issue preliminary and permanent injunctions only after providing
notice and an adversary hearing to the person sought to be enjoined. 93 These procedural requirements assume the existence of
adverse parties. 4 Such an assumption may not be warranted when
orders are issued against a community to enforce a desegregation
judgment. When the plaintiff in a desegregation suit petitions for
such an order, the "adverse parties" are the plaintiff class and the
community at large. Unless there is an identifiable representative
of the community, notice and a hearing are impossible.9"
" FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). For the importance of an adversary hearing prior to the
issuance of an injunctive order under rule 65, see Sims v. Greene, 161 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1947).
'1 See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1), (b).
5 Even if a representative of the community's interests could be identified and given
notice and a hearing, the "class" of persons who are members of the community would not
be bound to orders directed to the representative unless their relationship to the representative is within rule 65(d) (as agent or as one in active concert). See United States v. American
Optical Co., 97 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ill. 1951). In this case, the United States brought an
antitrust suit against the American Optical Company and 22 named doctors, representing a
class of approximately 2,000 doctors charged with having received certain rebates in violation
of the Sherman Act. The court explained its injunction against a defendant class. "Not only
are the defendants alleged to be members of a class, but they are alleged to have participated
in active concert with the corporate defendants and other members of the class . . . ." Id.
at 70. The court emphasized that this defendant class injunction was consistent with rule
65(d) and conformed to common law notions of in personam jurisdiction. Id. at 69-70.
But see Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency, 485 F.2d 780
(D.C. Cir.), affd by an equally divided court sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973),
where a TRO against further proceedings in a suit pending in the Northern District of Mississippi had been issued against the parties to that suit. Subsequent to the issuance of that
restraining order, the district court in Mississippi allowed intervention by representatives of
a "class of farmers, all residents of Mississippi, producing cotton." The circuit court responded with an order that amended the TRO to include the individual intervenors and the
class they represented. The circuit court noted that rule 65(d) provides that "nonparties in
general" are not bound to TROs, but insisted that there was "an identity of interest between
the class intervenors . . . and the parties to our review proceedings." 485 F.2d at 784 n.2.
There is no indication that the representatives of the class intervenors were served with notice
before being included as parties to the TRO which had already been issued. Thus, the failure
to comply with rule 65(b)'s notice requirements explains the circuit court's attempt to establish an identity of interest between the class intervenors and the original parties to the TRO.
To support its argument, the court invoked the "inherent power to protect [a court's]
jurisdiction from being obstructed by the actions of non-parties properly on notice . .. ."
Id., citing United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1972), discussed in text and notes at
notes 152-90 infra.
If the circuit court had issued a separate TRO to the class intervenors, notice and hearing
for the representatives would have been possible. The class had already been defined, and
the named intervenors had established themselves as representatives. But even though this
class was appropriate for the purposes of intervention, it is doubtful that membership in such
a class could bind a person to the circuit court's TRO. Rule 65(d) does not mention a category
of bound nonparties equivalent to the "identity of interest" claimed by the circuit court. The
members of the intervenor class do not appear to be in an agency relation to the individual
intervenors or parties to the previous TRO, nor are they likely to be in active concert with
such persons. Thus, even if notice and a hearing are possible for representatives of a valid
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Another, and perhaps the most important, limit on the use of
injunctions and TROs is the "scope" limitation of rule 65.96 In rule
65(d), Congress declared that only parties and an exclusive enumeration of persons related to the parties are subject to the jurisdiction
of the enjoining court. The rule's enumeration of the class of persons who can be bound reflects the common law notion of in personam jurisdiction9 8 as a fundamental limit on the power to compel
obedience to a court order.9 The exceptions to this scope limitation
class, the members of the class itself will not be bound to an order directed to the class as a
defendant merely by virtue of membership in the class.
Compare the Supreme Court's recent indication that attenuated notions of privity similar to the "identity of interest" invoked in EnvironmentalDefense Fund do not suffice to bind
nonparties to injunctions, in Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine, 395 U.S. 100, 109-10 (1969) (injunction against subsidiary not binding on parent corporation). The Supreme Court cited Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1940), and Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), to support
the proposition that "[ilt
is elementary that one is not bound by a judgment in personam
[unless] . . .he is designated as a party. . .

."

395 U.S. at 110.

For a discussion of the interaction of rule 23 (class actions) and rule 65, see 0. Fiss,
INJUNCTIONS 676 (1972).
" "Scope" describes the jurisdictional limits on a court's injunctive power. See Regal
Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9 (1945); 7 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 65.13, at 65-109117 (2d ed. 1975). See generally 0. FIss, INJUNCTIONS 620-45 (1972); Developments in the
Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1028-31 (1965).
" Rule 65(d) states:

Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons
for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not
by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained;
and is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with
them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.
11As a matter of due process, a person is ordinarily not bound by an in personam
proceeding of which he had no notice and no opportunity to be heard. Cf. Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714 (1877) (personal judgment issued ex parte in state court against nonresident
without personal service of process offends due process).
" An examination of the evolution of rule 65(d) reflects the tension between effective use
of injunctions and the traditional requirement of in personam jurisdiction. This tension was
evident in the Supreme Court's language in two cases in the 1890s. In Scott v. Donald, 165
U.S. 107 (1897), the Court emphasized traditional jurisdictional requirements. "We do not
think it comports with well-settled principles of equity procedure to include [those not
named] in an injunction in a suit in which they were not heard or represented .... Id. at
117. In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548 (1897), on the other hand, contains language so broad as to
emasculate any jurisdictional limit. "To render a person amenable to an injunction it is
neither necessary that he should have been a party to the suit in which the injunction was
issued, nor to have been actually served with a copy of it, so long as he appears to have had
actual notice." Id. at 554.
In 1930, this apparent inconsistency was acknowledged in Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff,
42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930). Judge Hand, distinguishing Lennon, stated: "[N]o court can
make a decree which will bind any one but a party; . . . it cannot lawfully enjoin the world
at large, no matter how broadly it words its decree. If it assumes to do so, the decree is pro
tanto brutum fulmen, and the persons enjoined are free to ignore it." Id. at 832. Hand's
position was adopted by the Supreme Court in Chase Nat'l Bank v. City of Norwalk, 291 U.S.
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fall into two major categories. The first is a broad agency concept
that includes nonparties who could be said to be acting in the place
of the restrained party. In order to prevent the facile circumvention
of the injunction by persons acting on behalf of the party, those in
certain legal relationships to the named party will also be bound.10
The notion of acting on behalf of the bound party carries over into
the second major category, persons aiding and abetting the restrained party to disobey an injunction. Instead of emphasizing the
preexisting legal relationship, this category stresses the element of
conspiracy; persons in "active concert" are sufficiently related to
parties to justify binding them without naming them as addressees
or acquiring jurisdiction over them by personal service."'
A temporary restraining order can issue without prior notice
and hearing. ' TROs thus allow a court to enjoy the advantages of
431, 436-37 (1934), and reaffirmed in Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 13-14 (1945),
and Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969). See generally
Rendleman, supra note 8, at 901-111 In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 2806
(1976), the Supreme Court found a silence order concerning news coverage of a criminal trial
offensive to the first amendment. The Court noted that the need for in personam jurisdiction
is an additional obstacle to silence orders that apply to publication outside a court's territorial
jurisdiction.
'0 For a summary of the agency notion which binds unnamed persons to an injunctive
order, see text and authorities cited in Rendleman, supra note 8, at 892-99. For an expansive
view of the agency/privity exception, see Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168,
180 (1973), holding that bona fide purchasers of a business with unremedied unfair labor
practices, who had knowledge of such unfair practices, could be considered in privity with
the enjoined precedessor within the meaning of rule 65(d). The Court found that the "tie
between the offending employer and bona fide purchaser. . . establishes the requisite relationship of dependence." Id. The Court relied in part on United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261
(5th Cir. 1972), to support its liberal reading of the agency exception. See discussion in text
and notes at notes 152-190 infra.
101 See, e.g., Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 14 (1945); Chase Nat'l Bank v.
City of Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 436-37 (1934); Gay Students Organization v. Bonner, 509 F.2d
652, 657 (1st Cir. 1974); Heyman v. Kline, 444 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971); Bullock v. United
States, 265 F.2d 683 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 909 (1959); Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff,
42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930). A recent case which rejects an application of "active concert" as
a means of binding a successor in interest is Herrlein v. Kanakis, 526 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1975),
discussed at note 190 infra.
For critical discussions of the traditional equity categories of persons "sufficiently related" to parties to justify binding them, see Rendleman, supra note 8, at 877-82; Note,
BindingNonparties to Injunction Decrees, 49 MINN. L. Rzv. 719 (1965).
"I Rule 65(b) (1970) states:
A temporary restraining order may be granted without written or oral notice to the
adverse party or his attorney only if (1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by
affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or his attorney can be heard
in opposition, and (2) the applicant's attorney certifies to the court in writing the efforts,
if any, which have been made to give the notice and the reasons supporting his claim
that notice should not be required.
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injunctive orders' 3 while avoiding one of the major procedural limits
on the expeditious issuance of such orders. However, because "our
entire jurisprudence runs counter to the notion of court action taken
before reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard has been
granted both sides of a dispute,"'0 4 rule 65 imposes severe restrictions on the issuance of TROs. One such restriction is that the
issuance of ex parte orders is permitted only in situations where
plaintiffs cannot be protected if an order is delayed until an adversary hearing is held.' 5 Another restriction is embodied in the 1966
amendment to rule 65(b),10 1 which requires the applicant's attorney
to certify any attempts to give notice to the adverse party and the
reasons why notice should not be required in the particular case.,7
Still another statutory manifestation of the importance of prior notice is the ten-day limit on the duration of all TROs; after ten days
a hearing must be held to determine whether the order should be
made a preliminary or permanent injunction.' 5
The absence of notice and hearing requirements for the issuThe remainder of rule 65(b) requires that the order state why it was granted without notice
and why the injury threatened was irreparable, and sets a ten-day limit on ex parte TROs,
with a ten-day extension period permitted with the consent of the party being enjoined or on
a showing of good cause. Provision is made for an adverse party to appear and move for
dissolution or modification two days after notifying to the party who obtained the TRO.
"3 Objections to the application of the collateral bar rule to ex parte orders have emphasized the quasi-legislative character of such orders. See text and notes at notes 170 & 187
infra. The legislative quality of a judicial rule was recognized as a basis for relaxing the
collateral bar rule in In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971).
' Granny Goose Foods v. Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 70, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974).
The Court continued, "Ex parte temporary restraining orders are no doubt necessary in
certain circumstances .

. . ,

but under federal law they should be restricted to serving their

underlying purpose of preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable harm just so long
as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer." Id. (citation omitted).
'" FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
"" FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2).
"7 The 1966 Advisory Committee's Note to rule 65(b) explains this requirement:
In view of the possibly drastic consequences of a temporary restraining order, the opposition should be heard, if feasible, before the order is granted .... [W]hen time does
not permit of formal notice ... some expedient, such as telephonic notice to the attorney for the adverse party, [should] be resorted to if this can reasonably be done.
39 F.R.D. 69, 124-25 (1966). The courts have been scrupulous in requiring notice absent a
convincing showing of unreasonable difficulty and subsequent danger to the plaintiff's rights.
See, e.g., Emery Air Freight Corp. v. Local 295, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 449 F.2d 586, 591
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972). The requirement of reasonable efforts to
provide notice was given a constitutional dimension in Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of
Princess Anne County, 393 U.S. 175 (1968), where a county court issued an ex parte TRO
that operated as a prior restraint on speech. Notice when possible, but not the specific
requirements of rule 65(b), was held to be constitutionally required in the first amendment
context. See texts and notes at notes 200-11 infra.
"0 FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2).
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ance of TROs makes the limits on the scope of such orders crucial.
Like injunctions, TROs are binding only "upon the parties to the
action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys,
and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them
who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise." ' Ex parte TROs that seek to bind a group of persons by
naming them individually"' must be distinguished from those that
seek to bind a group by describing the characteristics of that class
of persons. When a described class of persons can be translated
easily into a list of names, the difference between party by enumeration and party by description is largely formal and insubstantial."
But when the group sought to be reached consists of unidentified
persons who are not related to an identifiable party who could adequately represent them, the group constitutes an undefinable
class." 2 In this situation, allowing persons "described" in an order
to be equated with "parties" is to claim a dramatic expansion of
113
equitable power.

Community resistance to the enforcement of school desegregation presents the problem of judicial control of an undefinable class.
However, the scope limitations of injunctions and ex parte TROs do
not preclude the effective use of injunctive orders to control community resistance in all situations. A court can wait to identify
individuals, especially leaders of various groups, who are resisting
the enforcement of the desegregation judgment before issuing injunctive orders addressed to such individuals.1 4 If a court expects
endemic community resistance for a substantial period of time,
CIv. P. 65(d).
,10In Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), the court named 139 individuals and
2 organizations as addressees of the restraining order. Thus, the class of demonstrators was
bound by name rather than description.
"' For a defendant class that could be named rather than described, see Hadnott v.
Amos, 295 F. Supp. 1003 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (per curiam), rev'd on other grounds, 394 U.S.
358, 399 (1969) (probate judges of all counties in Alabama); United States v. American
Optical Co., 97 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ill. 1451) (approximately 2,000 doctors engaged in rebate
scheme). In American Optical, the defendant class was in "active concert" within the meaning of rule 65(d). See note 95 supra.
"I2See, e.g., Hall v. United States, 472 F.2d 261, 266 (5th Cir. 1972). For other examples
of orders which purport to bind an undefinable class in the desegregation context, see note
21 supra.
,"3 See generally Note, Binding Nonparties to Injunction Decrees, 49 MINN. L. Rv. 719
(1965); Note, The Range of FederalInjunctions, 6 UTAH L. REv. 363 (1959); Note, Contempt
by Strangers to a FederalCourt Decree, 43 VA. L. REv. 1294 (1957); Note, Contempt Proceedings Against Persons Not Named in an Injunction, 46 HARv. L. REv. 1311 (1933).
"I See, e.g., Augustus v. School Bd., 507 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1975); Faubus v. United
States, 254 F.2d 797, 806-07 (8th Cir. 1958); Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 834 (1957).
I" FED. R.
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waiting for resisters to identify themselves by acts of obstruction can
be an effective method of coping with problems posed by an undefinable class."1 5 As more resisters are identified and enjoined, the
undefinable class is gradually reduced by the creation of defined
classes of enjoined parties and persons related to parties within the
meaning of rule 65(d).1 11 Coverage will never be as summary or as
broad as under orders purporting to bind "other persons acting independently . . . having notice,""' but the most persistent sources of
resistance and incitement to resistance will eventually become subject to the authority of the court.
Allowing those interfering with the court's decree to identify
themselves by taking a "free bite" before an injunction naming
them is issued may have serious drawbacks in some situations. If
community resistance is very unorganized, or if organization is very
diffuse, then the process of narrowing the classes of persons in the
undefinable class by the issuance of new injunctions designed to
reach groups of persons in active concert with the leaders-addressees
may be prohibitively slow and onerous for the court's needs and
capacities. ' In addition, the period immediately following the im"1 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. York, 429 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
954 (1971) (injunction against parents who refused to send their child to his newly assigned
school pursuant to a desegregation decree); Rendleman, supra note 8, at 909-10. But cf. 0.
Fiss, INJUNcMoNs 629 (1972) (questioning the "functional significance" of allowing resisters a
"second chance"). Professor Fiss speculates "as to whether the obstruction-of-justice concept
has emerged in a new form," and expresses doubt that the "second chance" is "rooted in any
deep sense of fairness." Id.
"I See, e.g., Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834 (1957),
where the district court issued a TRO naming Kasper and ordering him "and others" to
refrain from "interfering with the carrying out" of the school desegregation judgment, "either
by words, acts, or otherwise." Id. at 94. Kasper violated the order on the day he received
notice of its issuance. In an adversary hearing held after Kasper's violation, the appellate
court held the restraining order "to have been properly issued and. . .the evidence justified
its continuance as a preliminary injunction." Id. The injunction was made permanent eight
days after the TRO was issued. Since the leader of those interfering with the desegregation
decree could be identified, he could be personally restrained, then enjoined, from such resistance. Persons who, with knowledge of the order, acted in concert with him were also bound.
See Bullock v. United States, 265 F.2d 683 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 909 (1959), where
the defendant was convicted of contempt for violating the restraining order issued in Kasper
v. Brittain, despite the fact that he had not been named as a party to the TRO or to the
preliminary and permanent injunctions. Instead, Bullock was found to have acted in "active
concert" with Kasper, a party defendant. Id. at 687, 692; see note 95 supra.
' United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261, 263 (5th Cir. 1972).
"' See Brief for Respondents at 18, United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1972)
("In a normative and practical vein, district courts in school desegregation cases involving
the hybrid and volatile type of situation described herein should not be required to issue a
multitude of Orders or temporary restraining orders ad infinitum against a class of people
who are after the fact violators or otherwise undefinable").
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plementation of the desegregation decree, when injunctions are least
effective in terms of scope of coverage, may present the gravest
threat to civil order and the enforcement of the judgment.
C.

The All Writs Act

One statutory source of authority relied on by district courts to
issue injunctive orders enforcing their judgments is the All Writs
Act," 9 which authorizes courts to issue "all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their . . . jurisdictions" that are "agreeable to the
usages and principles of law."'' 0 This statute empowers courts to
enjoin actions that improperly impede or defeat the exercise of their
jurisdiction. The Act serves in part as a codification of the inherent
2
power of a court to enforce and protect its judgments and decrees.' 1
The All Writs Act does not confer original jurisdiction on a
district court. It can be invoked only in "aid" of jurisdiction already
acquired. 22 Although power under the Act is to be broadly construed
once jurisdiction is established,'2 the statute does not release a
court from compliance with fundamental procedural requirements.12 4 When a court issues an injunctive order pursuant to the
All Writs Act, it must have previously acquired jurisdiction over
the injunction defendant or fully complied with the procedures for
25
issuance of ex parte temporary restraints.
For congressional recognition of the inadequacy of such injunctive orders, see text and
notes at notes 130-34 infra.
11928 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970).
''

For the history of the All Writs Act, see 9 MOORE's

FEDERAL PRACTIcE

110.26, at 277-

78 (2d ed. 1975); Bell, The FederalAppellate Courts and the All Writs Act, 23 Sw. L.J. 858,
859-60 (1969). The Act confers the general common law writ power on the federal courts.
121Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 1, 6 (E.D. Mo. 1967),
afl'd sub nom. Osbourne v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 389 U.S. 579 (1968) (per
curiam); 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTicE 110.29, at 316-18 (2d ed. 1975).
"2 See 7B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACCE § 1651, at JC-803 (2d ed. 1975).
"2 E.g., Hamilton v. Nakai, 453 F.2d 152, 157 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945
(1972).
"I In Ben David v. Travisono, 495 F.2d 562 (1st Cir. 1974), the district court had issued
a preliminary injunction restraining prison officials from "brutalizing" inmates in retaliation
for their participation in a civil rights suit over which the court had jurisdiction. The court
did not give the reasons for the injunction or state with particularity the acts enjoined as
required by rule 65(d), nor did it consider the usual criteria governing the issuance of injunctive orders (e.g., probability of actual harm). The district court relied on § 1651 to justify
these relaxed procedures. On appeal, it was held that the district court had "confused its
substantive power to protect [its jurisdiction] with the procedural requirements governing
the use of such power," and the order was modified to comply with rule 65(d). 495 F.2d at
563.
22 In Commercial Security Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 456 F.2d 1352, 1355 (10th
Cir. 1972), the circuit court held that the lower court had no jurisdiction to enter an ex parte
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When a court retains jurisdiction over a school desegregation
decree,' 6 it conclusively establishes the independent basis of subject
matter jurisdiction necessary for the issuance of subsequent orders
under the All Writs Act.' 27 But unless subsequent orders are issued
to persons already parties to the underlying suit,12s neither the All
Writs Act nor the existence of retained jurisdiction dispenses with
the necessity of achieving personal jurisdiction over the addressees
of the orders and complying with rule 65. Orders directed to an
undefinable class of persons, who have not received notice or an
opportunity for a hearing prior to the issuance of an order, cannot
be justified by the All Writs Act whether or not combined with
retained jurisdiction.
D.

Obstruction of Justice
As part of the 1960 Civil Rights Act, Congress passed a new

injunction under § 1651 against the United States when the government had not been served
with process and was not before the court, stating that injunctions issued under § 1651 must
comply with the limits imposed by rule 65. See also E. F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F.
Supp. 371, 379 (S.D. Tex. 1969). But cf. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States,
273 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Mo. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Osbourne v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line
Co., 389 U.S. 579 (1968) (per curiam). Language in Mississippi Valley Barge Line suggests
that a court's power to issue orders to enforce judgments extends to all persons whether or
not they are parties to the original decree, 273 F. Supp. at 6, but in the case at bar, the persons
who violated the decree were acting in concert with the original parties and therefore were
within the scope of rule 65(d).
Section 1651 has been used in issuing silence orders prohibiting publications concerning
the accused during a criminal trial. See United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 6 n.10 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974) (court assumes, without deciding, that a lower court had
power to issue a silence order under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1970), granting jurisdiction over "all
offenses against the laws of the United States," without examining whether § 1651 authorizes
the issuance of "such an essentially injunctive order affecting persons who are not parties in
aid of its criminal jurisdiction"). See generally Rendleman, Free Press-FairTrial: Review of
Silence Orders, 52 N.C.L. REv. 127 (1973); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791,
2806 (1976) (questioning but not resolving whether a silence order could restrain publications
outside a court's jurisdiction).
In In Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955), the Supreme Court directed
district courts to retain jurisdiction over cases during the "period of transition" from a
segregated to a racially nondiscriminatory school system. For the limits on a desegregation
court's retention of jurisdiction, see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.
1, 12, 27-28 (1971).
17 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. York, 429 F.2d 66, 69 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 954 (1971); United States v. Farrar, 414 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1969).
Compare Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist., 238 F.2d 91, 103 (8th Cir. 1956), where § 1651
supported the issuance of a permanent injunction against persons who were conspiring to
interfere with school desegregation. The purpose of the injunction was not to enforce an
outstanding decree, but to protect from deliberate interference the school board's voluntary
efforts to comply with Brown. See note 162 infra.
' See, e.g., Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 829
(1958).
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obstruction of justice statute, section 1509 of the Federal Criminal
Code,"2 9 in part designed to deter and punish violent interference
with school desegregation decrees by making such conduct a federal
crime.' 3 The legislative history of section 1509 demonstrates the
congressional assumption that the judicial contempt power was
inadequate to enforce desegregation decrees.' 3' When confronted by
mass resistance, courts could not proceed against the leaders or
participants for contempt unless they were parties to the original
desegregation decree or acting in concert with such parties., In
order for a court to employ the contempt power, a party to the suit
had to return to court, and petition for and offer proof warranting a
new injunction against identifiable resistance leaders. The contempt sanction could be invoked only if those bound by the new

injunction subsequently violated

it.133

This method was rejected as

"a time-consuming procedure. . . of no practical use in producing
the prompt action needed. 1' 34 The statute was designed to reach
persons who were not parties to the desegregation decree, but who
acted so as to frustrate its enforcement by force or threat of force.
Section 1509 thus avoids the jurisdictional limits which had hampered the courts' use of the contempt power as an enforcement tool.
Section 1509 is typically applied in conjunction with the federal
criminal statutes designed to protect persons exercising their constiAct of May 6, 1960, 18 U.S.C. § 1509 (1970). This section provides:
Whoever, by threats or force, willfully prevents, obstructs, impedes, or interferes
with, or willfully attempts to prevent, obstruct, impede, or interfere with, the due exercise of rights or the performance of duties under any order, judgment, or decree of a court
of the United States, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both.
No injunctive or other civil relief against the conduct made criminal by this section
shall be denied on the ground that such conduct is a crime.
' The existing obstruction of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1970), which punished
those who impeded the "due administration ofjustice," was thought to be inadequate to cover
the problems raised by desegregation decrees. Narrow interpretations of "obstructions" of the
"due administration ofjustice" by the courts had raised doubts about the scope of the statute.
Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 300 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary,86th Cong., 1st Sess., 207-08 (1959) (statement of William P. Rogers) [hereinafter
cited as Hearingson H.R. 300]. The House report described the primary purpose of the bill
as "strengthening the penal law with respect to the obstruction of court orders in public school
desegregation cases." H.R. REP. No. 956, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959).
,",
H.R. REP. No. 956, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1942 (1959).
'12

132 Id.

'3 Id.; Hearings on H.R. 300, supra note 130, at 207. See generally Rendleman, supra
note 8, at 908-11; Note, Injunctions: Can They Bind PartiesNot Mentioned in Rule 65(d)?
35 U. Pirr. L. REv. 483, 496-97 (1973); text at notes 114-18 supra.
1 Hearings on H.R. 300, supra note 130, at 207. The use of an ex parte TRO to solve
the problem of the "time-consuming procedure" was not considered in the report or hearings.
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tutional rights. 35 Most section 1509 cases have involved actions
which are also state or federal crimes, such as bombing school buses
or violently assaulting persons during a protest against a desegregation decree.' 36 In this supplementary stance, section 1509 is not playing the central role in enforcing desegregation decrees envisioned by
Congress. A major reason 37 for this supplementary role is that section 1509's prohibition of "threats or force" does not reach all conduct which courts fear may obstruct the school desegregation pro38
cess.
The effectiveness of section 1509 is also limited by the procedural requirements of criminal statutes. Although a jury trial is not
always necessary for criminal contempt, 39 it is a requirement under
section 1509 unless waived by the defendant. 140Another impediment
'35 See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 525 F.2d 710 (1st Cir. 1975) (§ 1509 used in conjunction with 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(4)(A) (1970)); United States v. Hayes, 444 F.2d 472 (5th Cir.
1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1972); Rosecrans v. United States, 378 F.2d 561 (5th Cir.
1967) (§ 1509 used in conjunction with 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970)).
'3' United States v. Griffin, 525 F.2d 710 (1st Cir. 1975) (assault during demonstration);
United States v. Fruit, 507 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Hayes, 444 F.2d 472
(5th Cir. 1971) (bombing school buses); Rosecrans v. United States, 378 F.2d 561 (5th Cir.
1967) (bombing home of black parents).
"I Another reason for the limited use of § 1509 may be the nature of the evidence the
government must show to obtain a conviction. Because the statute punishes intentional
obstruction of a court decree, a defendant must be shown to have had knowledge of the
existence of the decree and to have acted with the specific intent to obstruct it. However,
this has not been a difficult showing to make. See United States v. Griffin, 525 F.2d 710, 713
(1st Cir. 1975), where the court suggested that it would be possible to infer such knowledge
from evidence of publicity given to a desegregation decree, or general neighborhood knowledge
of its existence.
"I E.g., Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., Nos. 7045 & 7291 (W.D. Ky.,
Sept. 6, 1975) (order prohibiting picketing near schools and gatherings along bus routes);
United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1972) (contempt citation affirmed for violation
of orderly entering public school grounds without authorization); Board of Educ. v. York, 429
F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971) (injunction against sending child
to neighborhood school rather than the school to which he was assigned under the desegregation plan); United States v. Farrar, 414 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1969) (injunction against interfering
with blacks sending their children to previously "white" schools under a freedom of choice
desegregation plan).
'3' See note 77 supra.
10 See, e.g., United States v. Fruit, 507 F.2d 194, 195 (6th Cir. 1974) (defendants waived
trial by jury in prosecution for violation of §§ 241, 1509).
When a defendant is charged with contempt for disobeying a court order, and the act of
contempt "also constitutes a criminal offense under any Act of Congress, or under the laws
of any state in which it was done," the accused can demand a trial by jury. 18 U.S.C. § 3691
(1970). Prosecutions for contempts which are also violations of federal or state criminal
statutes are brought under 18 U.S.C. § 402 (1970). See Clark v. Boynton, 362 F.2d 992, 99697 (5th Cir. 1966) (when acts of contempt are also arguably a violation of §§ 241, 242, or 1509,
a right to jury trial exists under §§ 402, 3691).
Exceptions are made for contempts committed in the presence of the court and for
contempts in a suit brought for or by the United States. 18 U.S.C. §§ 402, 3691 (1970).
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to expeditious enforcement is that an accused can defend by raising
constitutional objections, a form of attack unavailable in contempt
proceedings because of the collateral bar rule.' 4 ' Furthermore, as
with all federal criminal statutes except contempt, the enforcement
of section 1509 depends on the zeal of federal prosecutors, 4 thus
removing a quantum of judicial control over the vindication of judicial authority.
E.

The Gap Left by Conventional Remedies

The federal criminal statutes resurrected or specifically passed
to aid the courts in enforcing school desegregation are methods of
combating widespread community resistance, but restrictions attending the use of these statutes limit their effectiveness. Section
242 will reach only persons acting under color of law, and it is
doubtful that section 241 can reach purely private actions that violate fourteenth amendment rights. Although section 245 does reach
purely private actions in derogation of fourteenth amendment
rights, it does not apply to nonviolent resistance to desegregation.
Section 1509 is also specifically limited in scope to threats or force.
Thus, these statutes will not reach purely private nonviolent conduct which creates potentially dangerous and disruptive situations.' Some examples of this "gap" in coverage are gatherings or
picketing near school grounds or along bus routes, strong speech
which does not rise to the level of incitement or threat, economic
44
pressures, and refusing to send children to newly assigned schools.
A court can control conduct which escapes these statutory proscriptions by issuing injunctive orders to protect its judgments, but
the use of injunctions is strictly limited. The requirements of rule
65 may thwart the court's ability to render effective protection in
the face of widespread, organizationally diffuse community resistance to the decree. Injunctive relief in the school desegregation context is suitable for preventing long-term interference by those definable groups who would repeatedly attempt to hinder enforcement of
the decree, but as a method of stopping intermittent disruptive
behavior from diverse elements of the community, injunctive orders
are particularly ineffective. Temporary restraining orders avoid the
,' See note 81 supra.
,2

See I NAT'L COMM'N

ON REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS

602,

605 (1970). See also United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965).
"' The first amendment may present an important obstacle to extending these statutes
to reach such conduct. See note 11 supra; note 199 infra.
"I See note 138 supra.
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notice and hearing requirements of preliminary and permanent injunctions, but are effective for only ten days. Furthermore, they are
sparingly granted and, like injunctions, are binding only on those
named in the order, their agents, and those in active concert with
them. Unless a court can identify in advance those who are likely
to attempt to interfere with the decree, injunctive orders will not
effectively control mass community resistance.
Courts whose judgments are imperiled by angry and uncooperative communities have faced a "gap" in the enforcement remedies
available to counter resistance from an undefinable class. Some
judicial responses to this gap and the difficulties they raise can now
be considered.
III.

JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO THE PERCEIVED INADEQUACY OF
CONVENTIONAL REMEDIES

A.

The Undefinable Class Order

In response to the perceived inadequacy of conventional remedies for community resistance to school desegregation, some courts
have used an additional remedy-the undefinable class order."'
These orders share some of the characteristics of the more conventional methods of enforcing judgments, but the differences make
their validity suspect.'46 Undefinable class orders typically describe
the persons to be bound in terms of the activity which is proscribed.
Courts issuing these orders seek to bind an entire community by
using such phrases as "all persons shall" or "no person shall". There
is no provision for notice and hearing prior to the issuance of an
order. Those affected by the order typically will not receive a day
in court until contempt proceedings for a violation of the order are
held,'47 at which time the collateral bar rule prevents the contemnor
"I E.g., Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., Nos. 7045 & 7291 (W.D. Ky.,
July 30, 1975; Sept. 6, 1975); Lynch v. Snepp, 350 F. Supp. 1134 (N.D.N.C. 1972), rev'd on
other grounds, 472 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974); Stell v. Board
of Educ., No. 1316 (S.D. Ga., March 16, 1972); Mines v. Duval County School Bd., 338 F.
Supp. 1208 (M.D. Fla. 1971), supplemented, 350 F. Supp. 553 (1972).
"I See, e.g., Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., Nos. 7045 & 7291 (W.D. Ky.,
Sept. 2, 1975; Sept. 6, 1976) (the first order, like a TRO, expired in ten days on its own
terms; the second order had no such resemblance to a TRO); Stell v. Board of Educ., No.
1316 (S.D. Ga., March 16, 1972) (order declared to be a TRO complies with virtually none of
rule 65(b)'s requirements for the issuance of ex parte TROs).
"I A member of an undefinable class theoretically could request the issuing court to
dissolve, modify, or clarify the order. See, e.g., Lynch v. Snepp, 350 F. Supp. 1134 (W.D.N.C.
1972), rev'd on other grounds, 472 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974),
(state court injunction challenged). However, he may be denied standing to litigate the issue
of whether he is bound under the order, or prevented from intervening in the underlying suit

The University of Chicago Law Review

[44:111

from attacking the order's substantive validity.'
1. Hall v. United States. In Harringtonv. Colquitt County
Board of Education,' a direct appeal was taken from an order
enjoining named parties and "all persons who are residents of Colquitt County" from interfering with a desegregation judgment.'50
The Fifth Circuit held that the language enjoining the undefinable
class of residents was "impermissibly broad," and voided the offending language, citing rule 65(d). The portion of the order which
bound persons within the limits of rule 65(d) was upheld.'5 '
One year later, in Hall v. United States,'52 the Fifth Circuit
approved an undefinable class order as a response to the difficult
enforcement problems of school desegregation. Hall involved an
order issued by the district court in Mims v. Duval County School
Board' in response to allegations by the school superintendent and
the sheriff that outsiders were causing disruptions and violence in
a recently desegregated school. The order "enjoined and restrained"
a definable class of school children ("all students of Ribault High
School")'54 and an undefinable class of persons ("other persons acting independently") from doing specified acts, some of which were
beyond the reach of state and federal criminal laws and local ordinances.'5 5 Immediately after issuing the order, the court ordered the
sheriff to serve copies of the order on seven named persons, includat the injunction stage. See United States v. Wilhelm Reich Foundation, 17 F.R.D. 96 (D.
Me. 1954), aff'd sub. noma.Baker v. United States, 221 F.2d 957 (lst Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 842 (1955). Alternatively, the plaintiff could join him as a named defendant;
he would then be able to challenge the validity of the order, but not whether he is subject to
it.
If the order is a TRO, it is ordinarily not a final order for the purpose of appeal. See,
e.g., Smith v. Jackson State College, 441 F.2d 278, 279 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
" See note 81 supra.
,41449 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
150Id.
151Id.
152472 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1972). This case is discussed in Note, Injunctions: Can They
Bind PartiesNot Mentioned in Rule 65(d)? 35 U. PriT. L. REv. 483 (1973); 26 VAND. L. REv.
625 (1973).
"1 338 F. Supp. 1208 (M.D. Fla. 1971); see text and notes at notes 13-18 supra.
1'5It is likely that the described class of school children could have been named individually, but unclear that they could be bound as a class under rule 65(d). See note 95 supra.
" 472 F.2d at 263. The specific acts prohibited were: (1) obstructing class attendance;
(2) harassing faculty and staff; (3) harassing any student en route to and from school; (4)
vandalizing school property; (5) entering school grounds without authorization; and (6) disrupting the orderly operation of a school. The order provided that "[alnyone having notice
of this order who violates any of the terms thereof shall be subject to arrest, prosecution and
punishment. . . for criminal contempt." Id.
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ing Eric Hall.'55 It is clear that both the petitioners and the court
had identified Hall as one of the leaders of the "Black Front," a
group that had expressed its opposition to the desegregation plan.
Hall was not named as a party to the order, nor was he found to be
in active concert with either the parties to the desegregation suit or
the definable class of students described in the order. 57 Four days
after the order was issued, Hall appeared on the school grounds for
the purpose of violating the decree, was arrested, and subsequently
convicted for contempt.
The Fifth Circuit recognized that inclusion by description in an
order subsequent to a desegregation judgment did not join Hall as
a party to the desegregation suit.' 8 In order to uphold Hall's contempt conviction, the court had to reconcile the "all persons" language of the order with the acknowledgment in Harringtonthat
rule 65's "scope" limitations apply to desegregation enforcement
orders purporting to bind entire communities. The court distinguished Harringtonon the ground that the order there was a permanent injunction, in contrast to the order in Hall, which the court
"characterized" as a TRO'55 because it had been violated within ten
days after issuance. The court conceded that the order was subject
to the notice and hearing requirements codified in rule 65, but
declared that the order was within rule 65(b), which permits
temporary restraints to issue ex parte. However, the court failed to
examine whether the order met rule 65(b)'s requirements for the
issuance of ex parte TROs, and there is no indication that the order
did satisfy the statute's terms. "'
Even if the order in Hall satisfied the notice and hearing requirements of rule 65(b), ex parte TROs are still subject to the scope
requirements of rule 65(d): only named parties, their agents, and
those acting in concert with them are bound by a TRO. Eric Hall
did not fit into any of these categories. The Fifth Circuit did not
I5 The fact that Hall received notice by personal service suggests that the situation in
Hall was very similar to that in Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 834 (1957), discussed at note 116 supra.In both cases the court could identify the leaders
of the incipient resistance to a desegregation decree. But in Kasper, the leader was named
and served with notice before the order was issued.
472 F.2d at 266.
'5 Id. at 262
'5' Id. at 267-68
'" The facts that the petition identified Eric Hall as one of the disrupters and that the
court ordered the sheriff to serve Hall with a copy of the order immediately after issuance
indicate that Hall could have been given notice prior to the issuance of the order. There is
no evidence that the petitioners complied with rule 65(b)'s requirement of certifying attempts
to notify Hall and reasons why notice should be excused.
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attempt to characterize Hall as a "party" for the purposes of rule
65, but instead suggested that the order came within an implied
exception to the personal jurisdiction requirements of the rule. The
court offered several explanations for the existence of this exception,
based on general equitable principles and the special enforcement
problems of desegregation suits.
The court found that Hall had threatened both the plaintiffs'
constitutional right and the defendants' constitutional duty as adjudicated in Mims. Asserting that a court has "fundamental power to
make a binding adjudication between the parties properly before
it," ' 1 the panel distinguished the cases on which Hall had relied for
the common law rule that a nonparty who violates an injunction
cannot be held in contempt.1 2 The court invoked United States v.
United Mine Workers"3 to support a court's "inherent jurisdiction
to preserve . . .[the] ability to render judgment." ' United Mine
Workers held that a court has jurisdiction to issue preliminary orders to preserve the status quo pending a determination of its
jurisdiction to grant further relief. The Hall court's use of United
Mine Workers to justify orders addressed to "all persons acting
independently" is an unwarranted extension of that case in two
respects. First, the United Mine Workers doctrine has been limited
to cases where subject matter rather than in personam jurisdiction
472 F.2d at 265.
Id. at 264-65. The court noted with approval Chase Nat'l Bank v. City of Norwalk,
291 U.S. 431 (1934), and Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930), where
injunctions attempting to bind nonparties acting independently were invalidated, but insisted that "[tihis case is different." In Alemite and Chase, the activities of third persons
'would have harmed only the plaintiffs' interests. In contrast, the acts of Eric Hall impaired
not only the plaintiffs' rights but also the defendant school board's ability to fulfill their
obligations as defined in the desegregation decree.
The court cited Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist., 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956), to support its
argument that the facts in Hall justified the lower court's order. Brewer was the first case in
which a federal district court asserted the power to issue injunctions to protect the process of
school desegregation against private interference. The school board had fashioned a desegregation plan on its own initiative rather than in compliance with the court order. Id. at 93.
Private individuals threatened school board members, made inflammatory speeches urging
mass resistance, and proposed a boycott of the schools. The school board obtained an injunction prohibiting obstructive actions by these persons. In answer to the contention that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin the actions, the court held that it derived federal
question jurisdiction from the right of school board members to be free from interference
"with the performance of the constitutionally imposed duty." Id. at 99. Because the school
board had sworn to uphold the Constitution, it had a federally protected right to be free from
intentional interference with its attempt to comply with the mandate of Brown. Id. In Brewer,
the order enjoined only named parties, not an undefinable class, and thus is consistent with
Alemite and Chase. Id. at 93.
" 330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947).
"' United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 1972).
I"
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is in doubt.'65 Second, the court ignores the distinction between
orders designed to preserve the status quo pending the determination of a court's power to adjudicate rights and duties, and orders
designed to protect a judgment already rendered when its enforcement or satisfaction is threatened.' 6
The court in Hall invoked the need for "broad applications of
the power to punish for contempt. . . if courts are to protect their
ability to . . . make their remedial orders effective."'' 7 If the court

is suggesting the existence of a generalized contempt power to enforce its judgments, it seeks a truly radical expansion of the contempt power. Under section 401(3) of the Federal Criminal Code, a
court possesses the power to punish "disobedience or resistance to
its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command."', 8 The
contempt power codified in section 401 is not an unlimited grant of
punitive authority.'69 Judicial orders, in contrast to legislative enactments, prohibit or mandate only the actions of the specific individuals whose rights and duties have been adjudicated, and those
persons in special relations to such individuals.' 0 Thus, in Chase
," See Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 374 (1950); Cox, The Void Order and the
Duty to Obey, 16 U. CHI. L. REV. 86, 100 (1948); Rendleman, supra note 8, at 921-22; Rogers,
The Elusive Search for the Void Injunction: Res Judicata Principlesin Criminal Contempt
Proceedings,49 B.U.L. REV. 251, 272-73 (1969).
"' See Note, Injunctions: Can They Bind PartiesNot Mentioned in Rule 65(d)? 35 U.
Pirr. L. REV. 483, 490-91 (1973).
" 472 F.2d at 266.
u 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970), states:
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its
discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the

administration of justice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or
command.
This statute codifies the common law contempt power. For examples of cases invoking
an inherent contempt power, see Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 327 (1904); Ex
parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873). For a general discussion of the history of
the inherent contempt power, see Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure
in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37
HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1023-58 (1924).
"I Some courts have misconceived the notion of "disobedience or resistance." See, e.g.,
In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548 (1897); Russell v. United States, 86 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1936);
United States v. Shipp, 214 U.S. 386 (1909); Chisholm v. Caines, 121 F. 397 (D.S.C. 1903);
In re Reese, 107 F. 942 (8th Cir. 1901); Seaward v. Paterson, [1897] 1 Ch. 545 (C.A.). A
person cannot be said to "disobey" an instruction unless he has been ordered to obey it.
Similarly, "resistance" is properly limited to instances where a person had been ordered not
to resist. See Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 833 (2d Cir. 1930) ("[I]t is not the
act described which the decree may forbid, but only that act when the defendant does it").
" One of the faults of injunctive orders that purport to bind the world is the transmuta-
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National Bank v. City of Norwalk,' the Supreme Court indicated
that the existence of a generalized contempt power binding the
community at large to refrain from "disobedience or resistance" to
a court's order was contrary to "established principles of equity
jurisdiction and procedure."' 7 2 This result has been codified in rule
65(d) 173 and cannot be bypassed by cryptic references to a court's
need to be able to make an effectively binding adjudication.
The court found additional support for an exception to the
requirements of personal jurisdiction in the unique nature of school
desegregation decrees. One argument sought to establish that desegregation decrees are analogous to in rem injunctions, which are
"binding on all persons, regardless of notice."'7 Like a court adjudicating rights in a piece of property, a desegregation court "is necessarily faced with the danger that its judgment may be disrupted in
the future by members of an undefinable class."'7 5 The court reasoned from the similar enforcement problems of in rem and school
desegregation judgments to conclude that school desegregation decrees should not be strictly limited by the requirements of in personam jurisdiction. 7 1 In rem injunctions are an example of common
law contempt jurisdiction over strangers to a judgment that has not
been completely extinguished by rule 65(d).11 However, the exception is a narrow one,17 and the similarity of desegregation enforcement orders to the in rem exception does not convincingly advance
tion of the judicial process into a legislative process. "A particular controversy between
particular parties-which is the limited sphere of judicial power-is made the occasion for a
code of conduct governing the whole community." F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR
INJUNCTION 126 (1930); see Rendleman, supra note 8, at 926-33.
s' 291 U.S. 431 (1934).
m Id. at 436-37.
'" See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969); Regal
Knitwear v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 13 (1945).
'"1 472 F.2d at 266. See generally Dobbs, Contempt of Court-A Survey, 56 CORNELL L.
REV. 183, 257-59 (1971); Rendleman, supra note 8, at 911-16.
"
472 F.2d at 266.
'7' The court was apparently unwilling to adopt the in rem analogy in its entirety. A
nonparty who is ignorant of an in rem injunction can be held in contempt. See, e.g., Silvers
v. Traverse, 82 Iowa 52, 47 N.W. 888 (1891). In Hall, the court emphasized that the defendant
had violated the order with actual notice of its terms. 472 F.2d at 267.
"I See Rendleman, supra note 8, at 919-20, 927. The in rem theory has been vigorously
attacked as a violation of rule 65(d) and of due process requirements. See, e.g., Dobbs,
Contempt of Court-A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 257-59 (1971); cf. McKinney v.
Alabama, 424 U.S. 669 (1976) (state in rem proceeding held inadequately protective of first
amendment rights of those not in privity with the in rem defendants).
'"I Bankruptcy courts use a limited version of the in rem injunction. See 7 MOORE'S
FEORERAL PRACTICE 65.13, at 65-112 n.11 (2d ed. 1975). The cases cited in Hall to support
the use of in rem injunctions are almost all bankruptcy cases. 472 F.2d at 266.
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the court's assertion that the enforcement
orders at bar constitute
79
another distinct exception to the rule.
The court tied its analogy between desegregation orders and
actions in rem to the need for "broad and flexible remedial powers"
to achieve school desegregation."'0 Citing the Supreme Court's recognition of a desegregation court's expansive equity powers in
5 ' the court
Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education,'
in Hall affirmed a broad power to issue enforcement orders binding
an undefinable class. The opinion in Swann did emphasize the
"enhanced" equity powers that a district court could employ once
a constitutional violation had been found and a school board had
defaulted in its obligation to correct it."2 But the Court was considering only the nature and scope of affirmative duties that could be
imposed on parties to a desegregation suit and did not consider the
restraints or duties that could be imposed on persons who are not
parties to a desegregation suit. The Supreme Court has never asserted or implied that "enhanced equity powers" in the school desegregation context release a court from the traditional requirements of personal jurisdiction.
The Fifth Circuit offered yet another characteristic of school
desegregation judgments to support its contention that enforcement
orders addressed to an undefinable class constitute an exception to
the requirements of personal jurisdiction. The court argued that
Hall was bound under rule 65(d) by virtue of the desegregation
decree in Mims, over which the district court had retained jurisdiction.s8 There is no assertion that Hall was a "party" to the Mims
litigation. Rather, the court insisted that "[b]y deciding Mims and
retaining jurisdiction the district court had, in effect, adjudicated
the rights of the entire community."'8 4 As a member of that community, Hall stood in a relationship to the decree "within that
8 5 To assert that the court could bind
contemplated by Rule 65(d)."1
"I The Hall court's comparison of school desegregation enforcement orders to in rem
injunctions has been vigorously criticized. See Rendleman, supra note 8, at 919; Note,
Injunctions: Can They Bind Parties Not Mentioned in Rule 65(d)? 35 U. Pirr. L. REV. 483,
492 (1973).
472 F.2d at 266.
402 U.S. 1,6, 15 (1971).
'" Id. at 15.
" 472 F.2d 261, 266. The district court had retained jurisdiction "to enter such further
orders as might be necessary to effectuate its judgment." Id. at 262; see note 126 supra.
"' 472 F2d at 267.
' Id. See aLso Coffey v. Braddy, 372 F. Supp. 116 (M.D. Fla. 1971), which affirmed an
injunction enforcing a decree prohibiting discriminatory employment practices against "anyone having notice of this order who violates any of the terms thereof." The court relied on
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Hall merely because he was a member of the community whose
rights had been "adjudicated" is plainly contrary to the language
and purpose of rule 65(d).111 Hall's membership in the community
does not make him a named party to the desegregation decree, an
agent of a named party, or one in active concert with a named party.
To characterize a desegregation decree as "adjudicating" the rights
and duties of an entire community is tantamount to endorsing a
legislative role for the courts."7 While such an endorsement reflects
the enormous pressures on desegregation courts, these pressures do
not justify distortions of judicial power or an abrogation of traditional procedural safeguards.
In a final effort to avoid applying the plain language of rule
65(d), the court argued that resistance by an undefinable class "was
not a situation which could have been anticipated by the draftsmen
of procedural rules."'' 8 But an examination of the legislative history
of rule 65(d) rebuts such a contention. The drafters of the Clayton
Act, from which rule 65(d) was taken, worked in a context in which
labor injunctions governing "all persons" were frequently used to
combat similar problems of controlling mass resistance.)8 9
The Hall opinion leaves the rule and rationale of the case unclear."10 Since Harringtonwas distinguished on notice and hearing
rather than scope grounds, the court avoided explicitly defining the
Mims and Hall, noting that the use of the order in Hall to reach persons acting independently
was limited to situations in which those "acting independently" are "identified with parties
before the court." Id. at 125 n.2; cf. Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency, 485 F.2d 780, 784 n.2 (D.C. Cir.) (nonparties had an "identity of interest" with
parties), afV'd by an equally divided court sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973),
citing United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1972) see note 95 supra.
I" This theory is very close to the now discredited "obstruction of justice" theory of
contempt, under which a stranger who knowingly violates the terms of an injunction may be
held in contempt for interfering with the administration of justice. See generally 0. Fiss,
INJUNCTIONS 621-25 (1972); Rendleman, supra note 8, at 901-11.
11 See note 170 supra.
' 472 F.2d at 267.
"" See text and notes at notes 86-87 supra.
'" A subsequent application of Hall illustrates this confusion. Herrlein v. Kanakis, 526
F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1975), is the only case which has directly considered the impact of Hall on
binding nonparties to injunctive orders. Herrleinrefused to extend Hall's implied exception
to the language of rule 65(d) to successors in interest of a business owned by an injunction
defendant when such business was transferred before the injunction had issued. The Herrlein
court viewed the order in Hall as "akin to injunctions issued by courts. . . prohibiting certain
conduct within the area of courthouses." Id. at 255. This reference to direct contempt, see
Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 186 (1971), is puzzling, since
this variety of contempt was not mentioned in the Hall opinion. The Herrlein opinion also
emphasized the enforcement context of Hall as a means of distinguishing it from the case at
bar, but did not satisfactorily explain why the enforcement context should alter the requirements of rule 65(d). 526 F.2d at 255.
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limits of rule 65(d)'s relevance to enforcement orders directed to an
undefinable class. Hall purports to stand only for the narrow proposition that desegregation enforcement orders addressed to an undefinable class are valid if they can be characterized as temporary
restraints. But even this narrow holding cannot be reconciled with
the jurisdictional limit on equitable power codified in rule 65(d).
2. Newburg, Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Education. In
Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Education,"' the district
court responded to the problem of enforcing its desegregation decree
in much the same way as the district court in Mims. Both courts
issued orders directed to all persons, with no set expiration date,
enforceable by criminal contempt. 9 ' However, the Newburg Area
Council orders are novel in several respects. The first set of orders
directed to the community at large were appended to the desegregation plan. Rather than waiting for actual acts of interference to
occur, the court issued these orders sua sponte, in response to publicly declared threats of resistance. 9 3 These orders were modified
and supplemented after the plan was implemented. Some of the
activities proscribed were assembling in or near any public school
building without authorization by school authorities, gathering in
groups of three or more along school bus routes, and interfering with
any person performing his duty under the desegregation decree.',"
The order technique allowed the court to issue detailed restrictions
tailored to the problems it perceived, a flexibility that statutory
proscriptions could not provide. 95 The court did not hold adversary
hearings with anyone who would be affected by its "all persons"
"I Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1973), vacated
and remanded, 418 U.S. 918 (1973), opinionreinstatedwith modifications, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931, mandamus issued, 521 F.2d 578 (1975) (requiring
approval of desegregation plan).
"I See United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261, 263 (5th Cir. 1972) (discussing the Mims
order); Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., Nos. 7045 & 7291 (W.D. Ky., July 30,
1975; Sept. 6, 1975). It is unclear whether violation of the order of July 30 would be punished
by criminal contempt since the court refers to "federal custody and federal enforcement
proceeding," without specifying the relevant statutory authority. The order of September 6,
however, states explicitly that criminal contempt is the sanction for disobedience.
1,3Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., Nos. 7045 & 7291 (W.D. Ky., July
30, 1975).
"' Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., Nos. 7045 & 7291 (W.D. Ky., July 30,
1975; Sept. 6, 1975).
"' "[Tihis plan details what actions and activities are considered by the Court to be
vital to the successful implementation of the plan and what acts in violation thereof will be
treated . . . as obstacles . . . to the appropriate implementation of the plan . . . ...
Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., Nos. 7045 & 7291 (W.D. Ky., July 30, 1975).
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orders, instead relying extensively on judicial notice. 9' 6
In contrast to the order involved in Hall, the majority of the
orders in Newburg Area Council cannot be characterized as temporary restraints. 9 7 The orders which abolished certain protest zones
and prohibited assemblies of more than three persons along school
bus routes not only lacked any explicit ten-day limit but remained
in force for one year. Thus, the district court in Newburg Area
Council cannot rely on Hall to avoid the requirement that notice
and hearing be afforded prior to the issuance of the orders.
The Newburg Area Council orders directed to "any person" are
subject to the same personal jurisdiction objections as the orders
invalidated in Harringtonand upheld in Hall. In trying to bind an
undefinable class, these courts have, despite their disclaimers,
made all the world with notice of their orders potential contemnors.
Even if these orders could be characterized as TROs, they would be
invalid exercises of injunctive power. A person cannot be bound to
an ex parte decree unless he is a party or legally related to a party
within the meaning of rule 65(d). Allowing a class of "all those
acting independently" to be considered a valid description of
"party" for the purposes of rule 65(d) stretches the notion of "party"
beyond the breaking point.
3. First Amendment Infirmities of Undefinable Class Orders.
The procedural defects of undefinable class orders regulating speech
and assembly also create distinct first amendment problems. The
use of "all persons" injunctions to enforce school desegregation has
on several occasions dramatically restricted speech and assembly
opportunities for an entire community.19 This tendency to over'" E.g., Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., Nos. 7045 & 7291 (W.D. Ky.,
Sept. 2, 1975).
I" E.g., Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., Nos. 7045 & 7291 (W.D. Ky.,
July 30, 1975; Sept. 6, 1975).
" E.g., Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., Nos. 7045 & 7291 (W.D. Ky.,
Sept. 6, 1975) (order abolished all protest areas near schools, prohibited groups of more than
three from walking along bus routes, prohibited any person from entering school grounds
without official permission, and required a school board member to jam citizens' band radio
channels); United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261, 263 (5th Cir. 1972) (district court order
prohibited any person from entering school grounds without permission from authorities).
In Lynch v. Snepp, 350 F. Supp. 1134, 1140-43 (W.D.N.C. 1972), rev'd on othergrounds,
472 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974), the district court held that an
"all persons" enforcement order similar to those issued in Hall and Newburg Area Council
prohibiting entry onto school property without official permission was an invalid prior restraint on first amendment rights. In Barnhardt v. Meridian, 394 F.2d 454, 455 (5th Cir.
1968), a similar issue was raised when the plaintiffs and intervenor contended that the
"attempt to enjoin all private individuals . . . is an unconstitutional restriction of protected
activities and violative of the First Amendment." The court was, however, able to avoid
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broad restriction is closely linked to the undefinable class character
of such orders. 99'
The central importance of procedural safeguards in the issuance of TROs was emphasized in Carroll v. President & Commissioners of PrincessAnne County,100 where a temporary restraint was
issued ex parte by a state circuit court 0 ' to prevent several named
members of the National States Rights Party and the organization
itself from making speeches.2 12 In Carroll, it was entirely possible to
serve notice on the enjoined parties, 2 3 thus obtaining personal jurisdiction and affording a chance to contest the issuance of the order.
Justice Fortas's majority opinion noted the special importance of
procedural safeguards when prior restraints are involved,20' 4 and
asserted that the presumption against prior restraints may be overcome only when "careful procedural provisions, designed to assure
the fullest presentation and consideration of the matter which the
circumstances permit" have been used.2 5 The Court concluded that
since notice before issuance was possible, the protection of first
amendment rights required that such notice be given. If notice is
deciding this question by holding that an "any other person" order was an impermissible
deviation in policy from the model desegregation plan set forth in United States v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
"I The restrictions on expressive activity contained in the Newburg Area Council and
Morgan v. Kerrigan orders also raise questions of substantive first amendment law. These
questions have been treated elsewhere and are beyond the scope of this comment. See
generally Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1481 (1970); Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1970); Comment, The First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 H~av. L. REy. 844 (1970); Comment, Less Drastic
Means and the FirstAmendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
2- 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
20 Because the order was issued by a state court, the requirements of rule 65(b) did not
apply.
2 Local officials were concerned that racial tensions in the area would lead to violence
if the meeting was held; unrest at a previous rally had provided evidence of such danger. 393
U.S. at 176-77.
21 Id. at 182-83. Several named addressees of the order were served with copies the same
day the order was issued.
"I Id. at 181.
205 Id. One commentator has argued that Carroll has proven easy to distinguish.
Rendleman, Toward Due Process in Injunction Procedure, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 221, 229-30.
Rendleman suggests that Carrollhas been invoked only when pure speech, rather than the
mixture of speech with conduct known as "speech plus," was restrained, and when the order
is attacked directly rather than collaterally. He argues that these limitations have reduced
the salutary effect of Carroll.Id. at 229. But in McKinney v. Alabama, 96 S. Ct. 1189 (1976),
a state in rem proceeding against certain pornographic magazines was held inadequately
protective of the first amendment rights of those not in privity with the in rem defendants.
The Supreme Court allowed collateral attack of the in rem injunction, stressing the importance of true adversary proceedings in the first amendment context. However, the case did
not involve "speech plus," nor did the Court cite Carroll.
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possible, but not provided, the "careful procedural provisions" necessary to overcome the presumption against prior restraints are not
206
present.
In Carroll,the Supreme Court reasoned that when the Constitution demands a refined tailoring of restraints to accommodate
conflicting interests, the accuracy of the factual situation to which
the restraints must be "tailored" 27 assumes special importance.
When an order purports to bind "all those acting independently"
and is issued without any adversary hearing, precise tailoring of the
restraint is unlikely. 2 8 First amendment interests are afforded better protection in an adversary context where, on the basis of more
detailed and certain factual information concerning specific parties
before the court, a fuller picture of the competing interests can
emerge. 2 9 But it is impossible to hold an adversary hearing for each
member of an undefinable class before an order is issued, and it is
unclear that any number of "representative" adversary hearings
will in fact be representative or adequately protective of the interests affected by an order directed to an entire community.
In both Hall and Carroll, the petitioners had identified certain
individuals as the primary targets of the restraining orders. Nonetheless, both courts failed to give notice to those individuals before
2" Judgment as to whether the facts justify the use of the drastic power of injunction

necessarily turns on subtle and controversial considerations and upon a delicate assessment of the particular situation. . . .In the absence of evidence and argument offered
by both sides, there is insufficient assurance of the balanced analysis and careful conclusions which are essential in the area of First Amendment adjudication ....
. . . [Tihe order must be tailored as precisely as possible to the exact needs of
the case. . . . [T]he failure to invite participation of the party seeking to exercise First
Amendment rights reduces the possibility of a narrowly drawn order, and substantially
imperils the protection which the Amendment seeks to secure.
393 U.S. at 183.
1 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-21 (1972); Albany Welfare Rights
Organization v. Wyman, 493 F.2d 1379 (2d Cir. 1974).
Rule 65(d) also contains a "tailoring" requirement, providing that all injunctive orders
must be "specific in terms" and "describe in reasonable detail . . . the act or acts sought to
be retrained." Orders that prohibit all actions that "in any way" interfere with a desegregation decree, see note 4 supra, are thus impermissible under rule 65(d) as well as vulnerable
to first amendment overbreadth attack.
2*9 See Rendleman, Toward Due Process in Injunction Procedure, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 221,
236-37; Comment, Collateral Attack of Injunctions Restraining First Amendment Activity,
45 S. CAL. L. REv. 1083, 1099 (1972).
IN One commentator has suggested that regulation of speech by injunction is less repressive than licensing requirements, since "the burden of initiative is on the censor . . .; there
is less ambiguity about who is covered; and the original decision is made by a judge after an
adversary proceeding." Blasi, PriorRestraints on Demonstrations, 68 MIcH. L. REV. 1481,
1558 (1970). In Newburg, none of these characteristics were present: the orders issued sua
sponte, they purported to bind the entire community, and no adversary hearing was held.
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issuing orders purporting to bind them. The order in Hall, issued by
a federal district court, was subject to the requirements of rule 65.
Since the TRO involved in Carroll was issued by a state court, the
Supreme Court could not invoke rule 65 and instead relied on the
first amendment defects of the ex parte procedure to invalidate the
order. Carroll effectively makes rule 65(b)'s notice-when-possible
standard a constitutional requirement in the first amendment context. Under this standard Hall should have been named in the order
and given notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the issuance of the restraint on his protest activities on the school grounds.
Following this procedure would have made the injunction consistent
with rule 65 and provided the first amendment protections stressed
in Carroll.
In Newburg Area Council, it would have been more difficult for
the court to comply with the requirements of rule 65. Unlike Hall
and Carroll, where the pattern of and participants in disruptions
had already been established, the court in Newburg Area Council
imposed some restraints before any acts of resistance had occurred.210 Judge Gordon did note, however, that "certain individuals
in our community have publicly declared their intended resistance,
by use of force if necessary. 2 1 ' This suggests that the court could
have made a list of persons likely to disrupt the desegregation decree, similar to the list of named addressees in Carrolland the list
of individuals to be notified that was given to the sheriff in Hall.
If such a list of potential resisters had been compiled, the identified individuals could have been named as parties and given notice
and an opportunity for a hearing prior to the issuance of the order.
Other resisters acting independently could not be bound until they
could be identified and named in subsequent orders. The Newburg
Area Council court's failure to follow this process of gradually identifying sources of possible resistance precluded the satisfaction of
rule 65's notice and hearing requirements. Unless a person is named
as a party to an injunction, that person cannot receive the notice
and opportunity for a hearing that is protected by rule 65(a). Nor
can the conditions that limit the issuance of ex parte TROs under
rule 65(b) be satisfied. A court cannot avoid the requirement of
notifying the adverse parties on the ground that the "parties" are
unknown members of an undefinable class. The failure of the court
in Newburg Area Council to comply with rule 65 also fails to com210

See note 22 supra.

211

Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., Nos. 7045 & 7291 (W.D. Ky., July 30,

1975).
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port with Carroll'sinsistence on the importance of prior notice and
hearing in the first amendment context.
B.

Indirect Regulation

In Morgan v. Kerrigan,1 2 the district court did not employ "all
persons" orders, but instead attempted to control community resistance indirectly, by enjoining named persons and ordering them to
prevent an undefinable class from doing acts that the court considered threatening to the desegregation judgment. Judge Garrity issued orders to local officials, in addition to school board members,
directing them to take specified steps to ensure the peaceful implementation of the desegregation decree.2 13 This indirect method of
controlling private conduct avoids several of the major infirmities
of orders directed to an undefinable class. Because the court's orders
are addressed only to named parties, the scope requirements of rule
65(d) are satisfied. If the officials do not comply with the court's
orders, they will be subject to contempt, 24 but they will have been
provided notice and an opportunity to be heard. Private individuals
who violate the enforcement measures adopted by local officials
under the court's orders will be subject to the appropriate sanctions,
but not to contempt, since the private persons are not bound to any
judicial order. 2 5 The injunction addressed to officials may be either
preliminary or permanent. 2'1 Because preliminary injunctions are
212 Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass.), aff'd sub nor. Morgan v. Kerrigan,
509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975), desegregationplan ordered,
401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 431 (1st Cir. 1976).
213 Judge Garrity joined the Boston School Committee, the School Superintendent, and
the Mayor of Boston as parties to the desegregation suit. These "city defendants" were
ordered to "see to it" that the police prevent "all gatherings of three or more people and all
noisy or threatening conduct" near schools when such gatherings were likely to disrupt school
activities or make students and faculty "reasonably fearful for their safety" and "all gatherings of three or more people engaged in or threatening to engage in violent conduct" along
bus routes. See note 26 supra. The court also ordered the Mayor to request additional police
aid from other cities and the state, and if necessary to ask the Governor for assistance from
the National Guard. Id. In addition, the city defendants were ordered to prevent all unauthorized persons from entering school grounds. Id. Indirect orders were also issued in Newburg
Area Council. See note 23 supra.
211 A civil contempt sanction would be imposed. Telephone conversation with the office
of Judge Garrity, February 13, 1976.
21I The collateral bar rule, which prevents persons who have violated an injunctive order
from raising the defenses of invalidity or erroneousness of the order in a contempt proceeding,
does not apply in proceedings against persons who have violated an ordinance or police order.
See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965); note 81 supra.
2I Because notice and an adversary hearing for the enjoined parties are possible, the
court is not limited to TROs, which are valid only for ten days.
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issued after hearings often held on the basis of affidavits, '7 relatively swift and summary action is not precluded.
In addition, the indirect regulation of community resistance is
somewhat less offensive to first amendment interests than "all persons" injunctions. Hearings can be held with the named parties
prior to the issuance of the court's orders, but it is unclear that such
hearings result in more narrowly tailored regulation of public speech
and assembly, since the local officials are unlikely to provide adequate representation for the first amendment interests of the entire
community. 2' The absence of the collateral bar rule is more important for the protection of first amendment interests. A member of
the community can vindicate his first amendment rights by asserting the unconstitutionality of the restraints as a defense to a prosecution for violating such restraints.
Practical considerations also support the use of judicially sponsored and supervised plans to protect desegregation decrees from
community resistance. A school board working alone cannot ensure
that a desegregation plan will be effective.21 9 Busing plans in partic-

ular require the cooperation of several municipal agencies,
particularly transit systems, police departments, and traffic control
authorities. The best method of achieving this cooperation is judicial control and coordination of those agencies charged with regulating various kinds of private conduct.
Despite these advantages of indirect regulation, the authority
of a district court to intervene in the operations of state and local
agencies must be critically examined.2 20 It is first necessary to define
217 See 7 MOORE's

FEDERAL PRACTICE

65.0413],

at 65-59 to -65 (2d ed. 1975);

Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REV. 994, 1055 (1965).
218 Compare Morgan v. Kerrigan, No. 72-911-G (D. Mass., Sept. 5, 1975) (order issued
after hearings with local officials, directing local officials to prevent "gatherings of three or
more people engaged in or threatening to engage in violent conduct on or adjacent to any
school bus. . . route . . . which makes students or bus drivers reasonably fearful for their
safety"), with Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., Nos 7045 & 7291 (W.D. Ky.,
Sept. 6, 1976) (order issued after hearings with local officials not parties to the order requiring
that "persons, more than three in number, shall not gather or assemble along any bus route
in this . . . county while school buses are being operated along them").
2 Both Judge Garrity and Judge Gordon were convinced that their enforcement orders
were crucial to the success of the desegregation decree. Telephone conversations with the
offices of Judge Garrity and Judge Gordon, February 13, 1976.
220A threshold question is whether state and local government agencies can be sued in
federal court. The Supreme Court has construed the eleventh amendment to protect a nonconsenting state from suit in federal court by one of its own citizens as well as by a citizen of
another state. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908),
the Court held that a state attorney general could, in his individual capacity, be enjoined
from enforcing a state law which violated the fourteenth amendment. Ex parte Young significantly reduced eleventh amendment limits on the power of federal courts to enjoin state
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the prerequisites for making a non-school board agency a party to
the desegregation suit or the subject of an order designed to effectuate a desegregation decree. Once those prerequisites are determined, the limits of permissible judicial intervention in the affairs
of such an agency may be discussed.
1. The Requirement of an Independent Constitutional
Violation. Judicial intervention in the operation of a non-school
board agency that acts affirmatively to block a school desegregation
plan is not controversial.2 2 ' Because the agency has violated the
desegregation plaintiffs constitutional rights, it is properly subject
to the court's remedial powers. When official conduct has not directly caused a deprivation of constitutional rights, but is perceived
to have allowed private citizens to interfere with the exercise of
22
constitutional rights, a court's authority to intervene is less clear.1
officials from actions which violate constitutional rights. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

§ 27.03, at 499-500 (1972).
Recent Supreme Court opinions have stated that the only eleventh amendment bar to
suits against state officials is a prohibition of retroactive damages paid out of the state
treasury; prospective injunctive relief is not prohibited. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 96 S. Ct. 2666,
2672-73 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
"I State executive officials have been enjoined from preventing the implementation of a
desegregation decree. See, e.g., United States v. Barnett, 330 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1963), rev'd
on other grounds, 376 U.S. 681 (1964); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). See generally
Comment, Theories of Federalism and Civil Rights, 75 YALE L. J. 1007, 1014-17 (1966).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides for relief against state or local officials who act to
deprive any person of his constitutional right to attend public schools without regard to race.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) (1970), the federal courts have jurisdiction over § 1983 suits
without regard to the amount in controversy.
Although state and local officials can be enjoined under § 1983, they enjoy a qualified
immunity from liability for personal damages. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
The scope of the immunity depends on the discretion and responsibility of the office and the
circumstances under which the action was taken. Id. at 247-48.
22 The problem is to determine when the discriminatory actions of private citizens are
linked to official action or inaction so as to constitute state action within § 1983. The state's
connection with private misconduct will warrant judicial intervention when it amounts to no
more than passive permission for private discrimination, see, e.g., Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974), or use of state machinery to implement private discriminatory
TEXT

choices. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). See generally G. GuNTHER, CON-

915-16 (9th ed. 1975). Those cases which find state action under § 1983 all
involve antecedent private discriminatory conduct. In Morgan and New burgArea Council the
basis for judicial intervention is more tenuous. Individuals who walk along bus routes in
groups of more than three or who shout racial epithets are not violating anyone's constitutional rights. The only source of "state action" in police failing to stop such private conduct
consists of official inaction in the face of private conduct which does not itself constitute a
STITUTIONAL LAW
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This issue is implicated by the orders in Morgan v. Kerrigan commanding the police to prevent groups of more than three persons
from walking along bus routes, and by the orders in Newburg Area
Council instructing the city Safety Director to withhold parade permits for a period of time. These orders were not based on a constitutional violation on the part of officials or the agencies they represent, but the courts nevertheless claimed that the officials must
take specific steps in order to prevent private interference with the
22 3
desegregation decree.
Several recent cases indicate that judicial involvement in the
affairs of a non-school board agency without a prior constitutional
violation on the part of that agency is impermissible, and that relief
tailored to the independent constitutional violation defines the
boundaries of legitimate judicial involvement. In Milliken v.
Bradley,124 the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit 225 and held
that a federal court may not impose a multidistrict remedy for
single-district de jure school segregation. 22 A cross-district remedy
is conditioned on a showing that "racially discriminatory acts of the
state or local school districts, or of a single school district have been
a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation. ' ' 221 The court found
no evidence that the suburban school districts had been such a
"substantial cause of interdistrict segregation, "228 and rejected a
deprivation of constitutional rights. In this context, the attenuation of the state's involvement
with the deprivation of constitutional rights is extreme.
See notes 23 & 26 supra.
224 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
22 Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973). The circuit court agreed with the
lower court's reasoning that since the state of Michigan had been involved in maintaining
segregation in Detroit schools, and all "school districts are instrumentalities of the state," a
metropolitan-wide remedy was appropriate. Id. at 249-252. The Supreme Court found the
evidence of state involvement insufficient for a metropolitan-wide remedy. 418 U.S. at 74950.
V, The Supreme Court had previously upheld a Fourth Circuit decision that rejected an
interdistrict remedy for school segregation. In Bradley v. School Bd., 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D.
Va.), rev'd, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally divided court, 412 U.S. 92 (1973),
the district court had joined two predominantly white outlying counties to its decree without
requiring proof that the county boundaries had been drawn for segregative purposes or that
the counties' actions rendered them responsible for the city's segregation. 338 F. Supp. at 100.
The Fourth Circuit reversed, reasoning that absent proof that "the counties were. . . keeping
blacks in Richmond schools while allowing whites to flee . . ." there was no indication that
the county officials had acted with segregative intent and effect. 462 F.2d at 1065.
22 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974). The court cited Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971), for the "controlling principle. . . that the scope of the remedy
is determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation." 418 U.S. at 744.
2111418 U.S. at 745, 752. The district court had stated that it had not even considered
any evidence as to discriminatory actions of the suburban school districts. 345 F. Supp. 914,
920 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
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metropolitan-wide remedy despite the fact that without such a remedy effective desegregation was impossible."' Achieving "the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation" ' in one school district
does not justify judicial intervention in the affairs of school districts
that have not been implicated in a constitutional violation: "without an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there is no
constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy. ' 23' Milliken
thus suggests that a desegregation court lacks the authority to issue
orders like those involving the police department in Morgan and the
Safety Director in Newburg Area Council in the absence of constitutional violations attributable to those agencies. However, this application of Milliken is problematic, since the case was primarily concerned with preserving the autonomy of agencies in separate political units.
Boundary lines may be bridged where there has been a constitutional violation calling for interdistrict relief, but the notion
that school district lines may be casually ignored or treated as
a mere administrative convenience is contrary to the history of
public education in our country. No single tradition in public
Id. at 765 (White, J., dissenting); Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 249 (6th Cir.
1973).
21 418 U.S. at 780 (White, J., dissenting), quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971).
21 418 U.S. at 745. The Court does little to clarify the distinction between "interdistrict
violation" and "interdistrict effect" or to indicate what evidence will demonstrate their
existence. "[Ain interdistrict remedy might be in order where the racially discriminatory
acts of one or more school districts caused racial segregation in an adjacent district, or where
district lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of race." Id. It is insufficient for
plaintiffs to show that de jure segregation exists in one district and that no effective desegregation plan can be devised within that district's boundaries. The presence of de jure segregation in several districts is also insufficient to establish an interdistrict violation or effect.
Rather, plaintiffs must show that segregation in one district resulted from discriminatory
actions by officials in the other districts or by the state authorities responsible for drawing
district boundary lines.
Since Milliken, several cases have met these requirements for interdistrict relief. In
Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 931 (1975), the circuit court reconsidered the district court's findings in light of
Milliken, and held that "the situation presented is that of two districts in the same county
of the state being equally guilty in failing to eliminate all vestiges of segregation . . . ... 510
F.2d at 1361. The court also found a cross-district effect in the fact that black students had
been bused across district lines "for the purpose of aiding and implementing continued
segregation." Id. at 1360. As in Milliken, the emphasis is on finding culpability on the part
of school authorities as a condition for requiring them to participate in the remedy. See also
United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 541 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1976) (affirming a desegregation plan requiring interdistrict transfer of students on a finding that the exclusion of the
city school district from a state statute creating a consolidated county-wide government had
confined black students to the city schools).
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education is more deeply rooted than local control over the
operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought
essential both to the maintenance of community concern and
support for public schools and to quality of the educational
32
process.2
Such considerations do not apply to orders addressed to different
agencies within the same political unit, like the orders in Morgan
and Newburg Area Council. The Court in Milliken did not consider
the circumstances in which a desegregation court could legitimately
board
supervise agencies within the same political unit as a school 23
that are not vested with responsibility for the school system.
In Hart v. Community School Board, 3 the Second Circuit reviewed a desegregation order that had included several non-school
board agencies within New York City as defendants. The school
board had contended that residential patterns created and maintained by city, state, and federal housing authorities contributed to
racial imbalance in the schools. The housing officials were impleaded as third-party defendants. Following the principle announced in Brown v. Board of Education that school boards are
legally responsible for achieving school desegregation, the district
court held that liability for segregation could not be shifted to other
government agencies.2 5 Nevertheless, the housing authorities were
ordered to remain in the case and to present plans for ending residential discrimination in the area.2
The district court gave two reasons for refusing to dismiss these
non-school board agencies. First, even though the agencies were not
legally responsible for the school board's actions, "they are partly
'liable for' the harm, in the sense that their actions help maintain
segregated schools. . . . [N]o effective decree requiring desegregation of the schools is possible without a shift in the racial
composition of the tenants in the public housing controlled by third418 U.S. at 741-42.
m State and local officials who are responsible for the segregated condition of a school
system can and should be made parties to the desegregation suit. Under federal rule 19
(Joinder of Persons Needed For Just Adjudication), such officials could be joined if they are
necessary to effectuate complete relief and if their absence would insufficiently protect their
interests or those of persons already parties. Under federal rule 20 (Permissive Joinder), such
officials could be joined if it can be shown that their actions were part of a single transaction
or occurrence and raised a question of law or fact common to those already named as parties.
See, e.g., Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1970).
214 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D. N.Y. 1974), aff'd with modifications, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
m 383 F. Supp. at 752.
z11Id. at 753.
21

The University of Chicago Law Review

[44:111

party defendants. '23 7 The court viewed the presence of the housing
officials as necessary "to insure that the court's decree is not flouted
and is fully implemented." ' 8
Second, the district court invoked a broad notion of state responsibility for school desegregation to justify its refusal to dismiss
the third-party defendants. "[T]he state is responsible for carrying
out the decree of the court and it must use each of its arms . . . to
effectuate desegregation of the schools."' 9 Relying on this principle
of state responsibility, the court ordered that the other agencies that
would necessarily be involved in effectuating the decree be added
as parties. The Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Police Commissioner, and the Park Department were made parties to the desegregation suit and ordered to submit coordinated plans for transporting
2
and protecting the school children. 1
The district court relied on the Sixth Circuit decision in
Bradley v. Milliken24 ' to join government officials who had not been
found legally responsible for the segregated condition of the schools.
On appeal, the Second Circuit noted the Supreme Court's reversal
in Milliken and recommended the dismissal of the third-party housing authority defendants, even though they had not appealed and
were willing to remain as parties. 22 Because the third-party defendants had been found not liable for the constitutional violation, the
court held that no case or controversy remained as to them. 23 The
= Id. at 752-53.
Id. at 753. The court "mooted" the third-party claim on the basis of "the decision that
plaintiffs are constitutionally entitled to a comprehensive remedy." Id. at 754. The district
court rejected the impleader as improper under federal rule 14(a), since the housing authorities were not liable to the school board for the plaintiffs claims. By "mooting" the third-party
claim, however, the court was able to require the housing authorities to remain parties to the
suit.
= Id. Federal housing authorities were ordered to remain in the action because under
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), they had a responsibility not to cause segregated
schools. The district court also held that the federal housing authorities were in privity with
the defendants, and were thus bound under rule 65(d).
210 383 F.Supp. at 754, 758.
21 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973).
2*2512 F.2d at 56. The basis for the housing officials' willingness to remain was their view
that coordinated action would be helpful in implementing the desegregation decree.
243 Id. at 55-56. The circuit court reasoned that by "mooting" the third-party action, the
district court had effectively dismissed it. The district court had already relaxed its demands
on the third-party hosing authority defendants by only requiring them to submit periodic
reports, noting that "[t]he decretal tool is poorly designed for restructuring an entire community." 383 F. Supp. at 775.
Compare Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd with
modifications, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975), with United States v. Board of School Comm'rs,
541 F.2d 1211, 1222-23 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that the city housing authority was properly
joined to the desegregation decree when discriminatory site selection was found to have
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Second Circuit was equally concerned with what it considered an
unwarranted extension of judicial power to fashion remedies for
school segregation, the same problem that the Supreme Court had
confronted in Milliken.241 The district court had improperly retained
the third-party defendants in the suit in the absence of constitutional violations attributable to them. A district court should not be
in a position to "superintend so vast a series of continuing enterprises and . . .to interpose a remedy whenever [the judge] does
not agree with the voluntary action undertaken by appropriate
24 5
public bodies.
Hart suggests that Milliken's requirement of an independent
constitutional violation as a predicate for judicial intervention extends to cases involving separate agencies within a single political
unit. Judicial supervision of agencies that are not liable for the
unconstitutional condition of the schools is not justified, even
though more substantial relief would thereby be provided to remedy
2 46
the harm caused by the school board's violation.
In Hills v. Gautreaux, 247 the Supreme Court approved a
metropolitan-wide remedy in a suit in which plaintiffs claimed that
the public housing system operated by the Chicago Housing Authority and financed and supervised by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development was racially segregated. The Court in
Gautreaux authorized a plan that included both urban and suburban political units. In contrast to Milliken, which involved numerous independent school districts, Gautreaux involved a defendant
that operated on an areawide, multidistrict basis. Proceeding from
"significantly contributed to the disparity in residential and school populations between the
inner city and the suburbs").

"1512 F.2d at 55-56 & n.25. The court expressed the fear that with supervisory authority

over nonculpable agencies, "the District Court will become. . a de facto 'legislative authority' to resolve these complex questions ....
" 512 F.2d at 56 n.25, quoting Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 743-44 (1974).
245 512 F.2d 44 at 56.
I" The Second Circuit did not address the continuing presence in the suit of the police
commissioner, recreation authority, and transit authority. Insofar as these agencies, like the
housing authorities, are neither responsible for the segregated condition of the schools nor
have committed acts interfering with the desegregation decree, the rationale of Hart requires
their dismissal from the suit. However, the Second Circuit noted that the desegregation court

could still ask the nonculpable agencies for cooperation on a voluntary basis. 512 F.2d at 56.
In Morgan v. Kerrigan, the district court included state education officials as parties to

the desegregation decree. The First Circuit found that these defendants had not contributed
to the segregated condition of Boston's schools, but ordered that they be retained in the suit
to help in devising remedies. 509 F.2d 580, 582-83 n.4 (1st Cir. 1974). The reasoning of Hart
and Milliken indicates that the state education officials should have been dismissed from the
suit.
242

96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976).
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this distinction, the Supreme Court focused on the aspects of
Milliken that are relevant to the question of the prerequisites for
judicial intervention in the operation of non-school board agencies.
The Court noted that Milliken was "actually based on fundamental limitations on the remedial powers of the federal courts to
restructure the operation of local and state governmental entities.2 4 Thus the principles expressed in Milliken go directly to the
remedial powers of the federal courts, and are not limited to the
"deeply-rooted tradition of local control of public schools. 2 49 The
district court's areawide remedy in Milliken was impermissible
"because it contemplated a judicial decree restructuring the operation of local governmental entities that were not implicated in any
constitutional violation. 2 0 The Court continued: "The critical distinction between HUD [in Gautreaux] and the suburban school
districts in Milliken is that-HUD [which was authorized to operate
on an areawide basis] has been found to have violated the Constitution. That violation provided the necessary predicate for the entry
of a remedial order against HUD . . .
These three cases suggest a standard for determining the limits
of judicial power to intervene in government agencies when devising
remedies for racial segregation. Milliken applies the requirement of
a constitutional violation to independent school districts. Hart can
be viewed as extending Milliken's requirement to judicial intervention in the affairs of non-school board agencies within a single political unit. Gautreaux reemphasizes that an independent constitutional violation on the part of an agency is a necessary predicate for
2
judicial intervention.
211
21

Id. at 1544.
Id. at 1544-45 & n.11.

Id. at 1545.
at 1546. The Court found that metropolitan-wide relief against HUD could be
tailored to avoid impermissible interference "with local governments and suburban housing
authorities that havi not been implicated in HUD's unconstitutional conduct." Id. at 1547.
Suburban municipalities would not be required to submit proposals to HUD and would retain
the right to insist on conformity with zoning and other land use restrictions. Such an order
would not "consolidate or in any way restructure local governmental units." Id. at 1550. See
also United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 541 F.2d 1211, 1222-23 (7th Cir. 1976)
(enjoining housing authorities from future construction of public housing in the city school
district).
21296 S. Ct. at 1550. An earlier stage of the Gautreaux case provides an analogous
example of this principle. In Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972), the court
reversed an injunction which terminated Model Cities Program funds for Chicago in an effort
to "bring pressure to bear" upon the Chicago Housing Authority to comply with an order
concerning selection of housing sites. The Seventh Circuit held that it was improper for a
district court to threaten termination of federal funds to a program which had not been proven
discriminatory in order to remedy discrimination in a different program, stressing the unto211

2"1Id.
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In Milliken the Supreme Court expressed the fear that a court
could not ascertain the limits of permissible judicial intervention
without an identifiable violation to repair, and that without such
limits the court might resemble a "legislative authority."3 The
existence of a constitutional violation authorizes judicial intervention in the first instance. This prerequisite is also the standard that
measures the appropriate degree of involvement. "Once a constitutional violation is found, a federal court is required to tailor 'the
scope of the remedy' to fit 'the nature and extent of the constitu-

tional violation.'

"254

2. The Scope of PermissibleJudicialIntervention. The orders
directed to the police in Morgan can be analyzed in terms of the
interaction of the predicates for and scope of judicial intervention
in the operations of non-school board agencies. 255 If the police were
to prevent black school children from entering schools, thus directly
frustrating a desegregation decree, the court could unquestionably
intervene to prevent this interference. If the police were to make no
effort to protect school children from known private violent resistance, the court could order the police to ensure that the students
could safely attend desegregated schools. 2 1 In Morgan, however, the
court sought to supervise the police despite the absence of active or
passive police misconduct interfering with school desegregation.
Judicial supervision was premised on the court's belief that certain
private conduct which was not prohibited by statute or ordinance
should be controlled. 257 However, examination of the requirement of
an independent constitutional violation as a predicate for judicial
intervention indicates that the court in Morgan had no such supervisory authority. The court mistakenly equated its power to interward effects that would result from such pressure tactics. Such effects, particularly the
detriment to innocent beneficiaries of nonculpable programs, were also present in Milliken
and were an important factor in that decision. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1545
(1976).
418 U.S. 717, 743-44 (1974).
254 Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1544 (1976),
citing Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
21 This discussion emphasizes orders to police as the most significant and likely means
for desegregation courts to control indirectly the conduct of the community. See, e.g., Hart
v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 758 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). For examples of cases in
which courts have ordered the police to protect persons exercising their constitutional rights,
see Smith v. Ross, 482 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1973); Belknap v. Leary, 427 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1970);
Huey v. Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864, 873 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Williams v. Wallace, 240 F.Supp.
100 (M.D. Ala. 1965). Deliberate official refusal to protect persons asserting constitutional
rights constitutes a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970). See, e.g., Lynch v. United States, 189
F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 1951); Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902, 907 (4th Cir. 1943).
"7 See text and notes at notes 22 & 26 supra.
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vene with its power to enforce all the measures it perceived to be
necessary to protect the implementation of the school desegregation
judgment. Morgan thus implicitly adopted the principle disapproved in Milliken, that "complete relief" defines the scope of judicial power in enforcing school desegregation.
Even if the police had violated the rights of the desegregation
plaintiffs, the validity of the Morgan court's remedial orders would
be doubtful. For example, in ordering that the Mayor "see to it"
that the police prevent gatherings of more than three persons along
the school bus routes, the court was not merely commanding the
police to enforce laws against breach of the peace or loitering, but
was instructing them to take specific steps to regulate private conduct. It is unlikely that a court can legitimately remedy a discriminatory failure to enforce the laws by giving detailed instructions as
to the manner of enforcement.
Several cases have considered the permissible degree of judicial
supervision of police operations when a court is fashioning a remedy
for a constitutional violation. The Supreme Court first approved the
use of injunctions as a remedy for unconstitutional police conduct
in Hague v. CIO.2-1 In this case the district court permanently enjoined the Mayor, the Police Chief, and other city officials from continuing their "deliberate policy" of preventing plaintiffs from engaging in labor union organizational activities. The defendants had
acted pursuant to ordinances regulating public meetings and prohibiting leafleting. The district court enjoined the enforcement of
these laws on first amendment grounds and instructed the defendants as to the condition under which leafleting and public meetings were to be allowed. The Court affirmed the injunction, but
modified its terms. "[T]he decree goes too far . . . . As the ordinance is void, the respondents are entitled to a decree so declaring
and an injunction against its enforcement. . . .The court cannot
rewrite the ordinance .... "1259
In Allee v. Medrano,6 0 the Supreme Court affirmed an injunction against a "persistent pattern of police misconduct" 21 which
had intimidated the plaintiffs in the exercise of their constitutional
rights. The injunction had issued only after a showing of a persistent
and pervasive pattern of misconduct, 2 2 and did "no more than re307 U.S. 496 (1939).
21,
Id. at 518 (opinion of Roberts, J.).
' 416 U.S. 802 (1974).
2 Id. at 815. See also Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
2'1"Isolated incidents of police misconduct under valid statutes would not.
"'

. .

be cause
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2 6 The district
quire the police to abide by constitutional restraints.""
court was not involved in a detailed supervision of police operations."6 4
In Rizzo v. Goode,' 5 the Court reaffirmed the importance of
limiting judicial supervision of police operations to that necessary
to remedy specific constitutional violations. The Mayor, the Police
Commissioner, and the City Managing Director of Philadelphia
were charged with authorizing, encouraging, and failing to prevent
the misconduct of unnamed police officers. The district court found
that the named defendants had not developed a policy of violating
the rights of the plaintiff classes, but did find enough violations to
justify a court-ordered plan for the processing of citizens' complaints by the police and for overhauling police disciplinary procedures. Authority for this remedy was grounded in the assertion that
a federal court's power to "supervise the functioning of the police
department . . . is firmly established.2 16 The Third Circuit affirmed, with modifications. 217 The Supreme Court reversed as to
both the finding of a violation warranting court intervention and the
scope of relief granted. 281 The grounds for reversal raise serious questions about the validity of the type of orders issued in Morgan v.
Kerrigan to control police operations.
The first ground for reversal was the absence of a justiciable
case or controversy between the named plaintiffs and defendants." 9
The incidents of police misconduct were not shown to be directly
chargeable to the named defendants. The district court had found
that the "sole causal connection" between the defendants and the
named plaintiffs was that future instances of police misconduct
2
might well occur unless internal police regulations were changed. 11
Because the named plaintiffs were unable to show that they would
be victims of future police misconduct, the Supreme Court held that

for the exercise of a federal court's equitable powers." Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 815
(1974).
=3

Id. at 814.

"IEven where a continuing pattern of police misconduct has been found, federal courts
have sought to avoid "unnecessary interference with the daily operations of the police." See,
e.g., Calvin v. Conlisk, 520 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1975) (dismissal reversed in part), vacated and
remanded, 424 U.S. 902, dismissal aff'd, 534 F.2d 1251 (7th Cir. 1976).
-5 423 U.S. 362 (1976).

2"Council of Organizations v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1320 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
" Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974).
2" Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
21,Id. at 371-73.
'" Id. at 371.
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the named7 plaintiffs lacked the requisite "personal stake in the
2
outcome. 1
The second ground for reversal was the Court's interpretation
of section 1983.22 The plaintiffs had argued that since citizens had
a right to be free from unconstitutional abuses of police power,
supervisory officials had a corresponding duty to minimize the incidence of such abuses. Claiming a default of this duty on the basis
of statistics concerning the number of police abuses, the plaintiffs
asserted a right to broad equitable relief against supervisory officials. 27 The Supreme Court rejected this application of section 1983,
relying on Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education.
The majority viewed the plaintiffs' argument as an impermissible
attempt to construe section 1983 to encompass vicarious liability
based on respondeat superior. The Swann principle that "judicial
powers may be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional violation" was interpreted to require a constitutional violation committed through the deliberate acts of responsible authorities.274 Such an
interpretation precludes attributing responsibility to supervisory
officials on the basis of the misconduct of individual officers who on
their own initiative deprive individuals of their constitutional
rights. 27
Principles of separation of powers and federalism were invoked
to support this interpretation of section 1983. The Court accepted
"the well-established rule that the Government has traditionally
been granted the widest latitude in the 'dispatch of its own internal
affairs.' ",276 This principle of judicial restraint was combined with
notions of federalism to support the rejection of the district court's
assertion of a "firmly established" power to supervise the functioning of a local police department. 277 The Court found that the limits
on federal court interference in state judicial proceedings "have
applicability" to federal injunctions against state and local execu2'1 Id. at 372-73. The standing requirements articulated in Rizzo were applied in Calvin
v. Conlisk, 534 F.2d 1251 (7th Cir. 1976), to preclude injunctive relief against supervisory
police authorities based on "'hypothetical' complaints about what some unknown policeman
'might do to [the plaintiffs] in the future ....
' Id. at 1252.
272 423 U.S. at 376-79.
17,

Id. at 375-76.

"I Id. at 377, quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16
(1971).
271 Recourse was limited to suits against individual policemen whose conduct had violated citizens' constitutional rights.
27S 423 U.S. at 378-79, quoting Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 83 (1974).
2 423 U.S. at 381.
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tive agencies as well. 8 The opinion did not specify the extent to
which these limits would apply, but a deliberate policy on the part
of supervisory officials that deprives individuals of their constitutional rights would presumably overcome the limits that notions of
federalism impose on judicial intervention. Principles of federalism
would remain important in framing relief so as not to impinge unnecessarily on discretionary decisions by the agency heads."
In Hart v. Community School Board, as in Morgan, there was
no showing of a deliberate policy of providing inadequate or unequal
protection from private resistance to desegregation. Applying the
principles articulated in Rizzo, it is clear that there was no case or
controversy as to the police department; the Police Commissioner
should not have been joined in the suit. In Morgan v. Kerrigan the
Mayor was ordered to direct the police to prevent certain private
conduct. Under Rizzo, neither the Mayor nor police officials could
have been subjected to such an order absent a showing of constitutional violations attributable to them. Furthermore, requiring the
police to take specific steps to protect the implementation of the
desegregation decree conflicts with the principles of federalism that
Rizzo insisted should limit the scope of remedial measures. Interference with police discretion is impermissible absent a showing of an
affirmative link between the use of that discretion and a deprivation
I" The principles that have traditionally guided the federal courts in balancing the
national policy of abstaining from interference in pending state court proceedings with the
special federal responsibility for protecting persons from unconstitutional state action have
recently undergone swift change. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); O'Shea
v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479 (1965). See generally Note, Younger Grows Older: Equitable Abstention in Civil
Proceedings, 50 N.Y.U.L. REv. 870 (1975).
It is unclear which principles from the abstention cases the Court in Rizzo applied to
judicial intervention in state and local executive agencies. After Rizzo, considerations of "Our
Federalism" require a court to consider whether a showing of bad faith is necessary in every
case involving challenges to state and local executive agencies. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 44 (1971). Courts must also determine whether the plaintiffs have less drastic means
available for redress, and whether great, immediate, and irreparable harm is threatened. Id.
Unless these conditions are satisfied, federal injunctive relief is not warranted.
21 423 U.S. at 379-80. See also Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965),
where the court ordered the police to provide full protection to participants in a civil rights
march that had been authorized by a court order. Even though judicial intervention was
warranted by the manifestations of police hostility to the marchers, the court did not instruct
the police as to specific steps they should take to protect the marchers; this was left to the
discretion of the police. In Wolin v. Port Auth., 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968), the police had
prevented the plaintiffs from passing out leaflets. The court ordered the police to protect the
plaintiffs in their exercise of first amendment rights, but noted that "the law enforcement
officers must be permitted to exercise judgment in maintaining order." Id. at 94 n.16; see
text and notes at notes 258-59 supra.
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of constitutional rights.
These limits on judicial authority over the police or other local
agencies do not significantly weaken the enforcement powers of district courts in desegregation suits. A court is still free to offer suggestions and request voluntary cooperation in implementing its decree. 20 If the police fail to protect constitutional rights as a result
of a deliberate policy, then section 1983 warrants equitable relief.
But when private conduct not in itself discriminatory or unlawful
presents only a potential for the deprivation of constitutional rights
at some future time, 28' no affirmative duty to prevent such conduct
arises. Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that a court should
not be in a position either to create such a duty or to determine how
it should be fulfilled.
Morgan and Newburg Area Council can be distinguished from
the cases analyzed above. Unlike the suburban school districts in
Milliken, the police and the Safety Director have a duty to aid the
city school board's desegregation efforts by maintaining order. Unlike the remedial orders disapproved by the Court in both Milliken
and Rizzo, the orders involving the police in Morgan and the Safety
Director in Newburg Area Council did not restructure the internal
affairs of the local agencies. 2 2 However, these distinctions may not
overcome the rule emerging from the Supreme Court's decisions: an
independent constitutional violation is a necessary predicate of judicial intervention and defines the scope of permissible remedial
measures. The question raised, but not yet resolved, is the extent
to which the Court will apply these requirements. Until the Court
defines the limits of its holdings, the legitimacy of orders like those
issued in Morgan and Newburg Area Council remains in doubt.
CONCLUSION

Congress and the federal courts have both responded to the
persistent problem of community resistance to school desegregation.
The congressional response was to enact sections 245 and 1509 of the
Federal Criminal Code. Neither these statutes, nor the laws they
were designed to supplement, proscribe all private conduct that
interferes with the right to attend desegregated schools. The judicial
2 See, e.g., Hart v. Community School Bd., 512 F.2d 37, 56 (2d Cir. 1975) (although
the district court cannot retain jurisdiction over nonculpable officials, the court may ask them
for help on a "voluntary basis").
, See note 222 supra.
Z Cf. Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1550 (1976) (injunction authorizing interdistrict
relief would not "consolidate or in any way restructure local governmental units").
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response, however, has exhibited less restraint. In attempting to
regulate conduct beyond the reach of these statutes, courts have
sought to enjoin the "undefinable class" of potential resisters to
school desegregation decrees by issuing orders addressed to "all persons." These orders endanger the values protected by the statutory
limits on the exercise of equitable power and by the first amendment. Attempts to regulate community resistance by enjoining local
agencies that have not committed any constitutional violations may
also exceed the limits on equitable power suggested by recent Supreme Court decisions.
Although community resistance remains a difficult problem,
the judicial perception of the need for expanded equitable powers
to protect desegregation decrees is unwarranted. Sections 241, 245,
and 1509, together with injunctions properly issued against named
parties, afford substantial protection to the constitutional right to
attend desegregated schools. Judicial fears of community resistance
to school desegregation must not be allowed to create an exception
to fundamental equitable principles.
H. J. Escher
Lee Hyman Gudel

